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OF LIBEL, LANGUAGE, AND LAW: NEW YORK
TIMES V SULLIVAN AT TWENTY-FIVE
SHELDON W.

HALPERN t

This Article is an exploration of the currentstate of the law of defamation now that a quarter century has passed since the landmark New
York Times v. Sullivan opinion. With that case, the Supreme Court
began a process of constitutionalizationthat hasproduced a chaotic system thatfails to meet the great objective of accommodating the individual's interest in reputation to the strictures of the first amendment.
ProfessorHalpern examines Sullivan and its progeny,placing a realistic
perspective on a doctrine that has become accepted notwithstanding its
formation through shaky Court majorities and less than compelling
logic andsuggests an approachtowardaccommodation of the apparently
irreconcilableinterests. To realize the ideals of Sullivan withoutpunishing innocent erroror leaving the victim of defamation helpless, the author proposes, in place of the present fragmented, confusing, and
unsatisfying array of criteria and requirements, a unitary system of
practice, damages, andfault predicated on concepts of professionalism.
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INTRODUCTION

The 1988 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine
v. FalwellI was itself not very remarkable. A unanimous Court found, essentially, that a failed libel claim 2 could not be saved by calling it "intentional infliction of emotional harm." 3 A different result, penalizing a blatant, albeit

offensive, parody would have been surprising. That the relatively new tort of
intentional infliction of emotional harm through the use of speech would be sub-

ject to constitutional constraints similar to those imposed upon the defamation
action seems only a natural corollary of the development in first amendment law
4
over the past twenty-five years.

What is remarkable is the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion
in Hustler, took pains to reaffirm a broad reading of New York Times v. Sullivan 5 and its progeny. 6 The Chief Justice affirmed the Court's "considered judg-

ment that [the Sullivan] standard is necessary to give adequate 'breathing space'
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment."'7 Indeed, this unequivocal

affirmation of the vitality of Sullivan, a gesture more to history than to the exigencies of the case at hand, prompted Justice White's observation that Sullivan

"has little to do with this case." 8
Much, of course, has been written about Sullivan,9 from its direct impact
1. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The case involved an "ad parody" in Hustler magazine, detailing an
incestuous rendezvous in an outhouse between Falwell and his mother. Falwell sued for damages for
libel and for the intentional infliction of emotional harm. The jury returned a verdict for defendant
on the libel claim, finding "that the Hustler ad parody could not 'reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts about [Falwell] or actual events in which [he] participated.' "Id. at -, 108 S.
Ct. at 878. At the same time, on the emotional harm claim, the jury awarded him $100,000 in actual
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, a judgment affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), and reversed by the
Supreme Court, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
2. The finding of inherent incredibility served to destroy the libel claim; as a nonfactual assertion, the utterance was constitutionally protected "opinion." See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d
438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); infra notes 153-205 and accompanying text.
But cf Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, L., J.) (discussing the
irrelevance of credibility to a defamation claim based upon ridicule, a view implicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Hustler).
3. Although the intention to inflict harm is the essence of the emotional distress claim, as
distinct from the reputational injury in defamation, the Court held that the former tort, however

outrageous the utterance, may not create a wider range of liability than the latter. Hustler,485 U.S.

at _,108 S. Ct. at 882.
4. For discussion of the Hustler opinion and its implications for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm, see Note, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: The Application of the Actual Malice
Standard to IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 825 (1988).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Justice Rehnquist quoted particularly from three opinions with which he had expressed
some reservation: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
See Hustler,485 U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 879-80 (quoting Gertz, Bose and Hepps); cf Hepps, 475 U.S.
at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Rehnquist); Oilman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 112830 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari to Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)); Bose, 466 U.S. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. Hustler, 485 U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 882.
8. Id. at _, 108 S.Ct. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
9. The literature starts, essentially, with Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment", 1964 SuP. Cr.REV. 191. Exemplary contemporaneous
commentary is collected in Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law
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upon the viability of the young civil rights movement in the South, 10 to a critical

reappraisal of the legal validity of the opinion.11 The simply stated issue from
which Justice Brennan began produced a complex structure serving to perform

three main functions:
The Court's opinion... aimed at three general goals: (1) to eliminate yet another weapon in the arsenal of segregationists in the South;
(2) to reformulate the law of libel and thereby to eliminate what Justice
Brennan called "the chilling" effect of traditional defamation laws; (3)

most ambitiously, to link the changes in libel law to a new constitutional approach to free-speech issues, one that supposedly broke away
from old legal formulas.1 2

As the starting point for the reformulation of the law of defamation in constitutional terms, Sullivan remains one of the most significant and influential
Supreme Court opinions. It is the extension of doctrine first enunciated there-

the use of Sullivan as the linchpin holding together an elaborate structure far
removed from the issues directly presented in 1964-that makes the opinion

great, whatever views one might otherwise have of it. It ii Sullivan as we have
come to understand it, rather than Sullivan as a case concerned with a city commissioner's claim arising from a civil rights movement advertisement, that pro-

vides the basis for denying relief to a television evangelist suing a sensational
"adult" magazine.1 3

Sullivan at twenty-five represents an era of sweeping change in the law-

and in American society's attitude--as it affects the individual's interest in reputation. The quarter century that has passed since the issuance of Justice Bren-

nan's opinion has witnessed the application of an increasingly complex gloss to
the comparatively simple proposition with which the Court dealt in Sullivan.
ofLibel, 132 U. PA. L. REV.1,7 n.49 (1983). Of the more recent works, compare Lewis, New York
Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The CentralMeaningof the FirstAmendment'"
83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983) with Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 782 (1986).
10. See, eg., Kalven, supra note 9,at 192 ("[A] cursory examination of the case reveals that the
decision was responsive to the pressures of the day created by the Negro protest movement and thus
raises the question ...whether the Supreme Court has adhered to neutral principles in reaching its
conclusion."); Lewis, supra note 9, at 605 ("What was at stake ...was more than the fate of one
newspaper. It was the ability, or the willingness, of the American press to go on covering the racial
conflict in the South.... Tjhe libel suit... was a weapon in a political struggle."); Ottley, Lewis &
Ottley, New York Times v. Sullivan: A Retrospective Examination, 33 DE PAUL L. REV.741 (1984).
Justice Black's concurring opinion describes the importance of the Court's action to the civil rights
movement:
The half-million-dollar verdict [upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court] does give
dramatic proof... that state libel laws threaten the very existence of an American press
virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the
conduct of public officials. The factual background of this case emphasizes the imminence
and enormity of that threat. One of the acute and highly emotional issues in this country
arises out of efforts of many people.., to continue state-commanded segregation of races
in the public schools and other public places.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J.,
concurring). See generally Lewis, Annals of Law: The Sullivan
Case, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 1984, at 52 (an extended discussion of the case, counsel, issues, and
strategy, as well as the implications of the case).
11. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 784-85.
12. N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEsT MEN 243 (1986).

13. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at -,108 S. Ct. at 882-83.
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Justice Brennan articulated a set of substantive and procedural constitutional
hurdles in the path of one class of defamation plaintiffs: against the absolute
liability inherent in the common-law action for 'defamation is juxtaposed a constitutional fault requirement; against a set of presumptions that served to make
the statement and proof of a defamation claim relatively simple is a constitutionally mandated shifting of the burden of proof and heightening of the quantum of
proof requisite to recovery. These hurdles have now been refined and tailored to
fit different classes of plaintiffs and situations far removed from that facing the
Sullivan Court.
It is too late in the day to argue productively whether Sullivan's assertion of
first amendment constraints on the law of defamation was "right" or "wrong";14
rather, our concern must be with the wisdom of its elaboration, expansion and
extension over the succeeding years. This process must examine whether Sullivan and its progeny together constitute a principled application of first amendment concerns to limit the reputational interest.
In examining the changes that have been rung on the Sullivan theme to
differentiate the principled from the situationally necessary, it seems appropriate
to separate the substantive from the procedural components of the constitutionalization process. The great substantive departure from prior law with which
Sullivan is identified-conditioning the cause of action on a demonstration of
the defendant's fault, in the form of "actual malice"'15-seems more the product
of accommodation and policy compromise than inevitable constitutional logic.16
As a result, the refinement and extension of the fault requirement by succeeding
opinions of the Court 17 are meandering streams of thought significantly removed from the fountainhead. Conversely, the constitutionalization of inhibitory procedures relating to the burden and quantum of proof' s emanating from
Sullivan has a coherence that justifies the succeeding elaboration, whatever one's
view as to the appropriate balance between the conflicting interests implicated in
a defamation action. In this context, this Article examines Sullivan and its progeny, seeking to place a realistic perspective on what has become accepted doctrine, notwithstanding its less than compelling logic, and suggesting an approach
that may accommodate the apparently irreconcilable interests. I suggest, in
place of the present fragmented, confusing and unsatisfying array of criteria and
requirements, a unitary system of practice, damages and fault predicated on concepts of professionalism. This system offers a more productive and workable
way to deal with the contemporary complexities that make arcane and virtually
inaccessible what was a rather simple attempt by the law to redress injury to
reputation.
14. But cf Epstein, supra note 9, at 784 ("there is... profit in focusing on the law of defamation itself as a source of the present discontent.., one could argue that the New York Times rule was

wrong").
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra note 22.
See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 42-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
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II.

A.

SULLIVAN AND ITS PROGENY

The Beginning

The first sentence of Justice Brennan's Sullivan opinion is instructive: "We
are required... to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in
a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct." 19
Certainly, Sullivan was new; it was "the first time" that the Supreme Court
spoke directly of the extent to which the first amendment limited the commonlaw defamation action. 20 The Court also addressed and quite summarily disposed of the complex question of state action as a predicate to a constitutional
claim, finding state action in "a State's power to award damages." 21 Whatever
other conflict may exist over the scope of constitutional protection for defamatory speech, there is no serious current dispute over the proposition that, by
virtue of the fourteenth amendment (making applicable to the states first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press), any defamation action implicates first amendment considerations. It is the extent of that implication and the
nature and scope of procedural and substantive protection afforded the defamation defendant that has engendered both controversy and confusion.
In Sullivan the Court was concerned with the use of a defamation action to
inhibit criticism of the official conduct of a public official, and the Sullivan
"rule," conditioning liability on the defendant's knowledge, or reckless disregard, of falsity, is expressly limited to that situation. 22 The Brennan opinion
excoriates the ignominious Sedition Act of 1798, with its sanctions against seditious libel, and to all intents and purposes declares it (academically) unconstitutional. 23 The articulated Sullivan rule was essentially a compromise between the
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
20. As Justice Goldberg noted in his concurrence, "[w]e must recognize that we are writing
upon a clean slate." Id. at 299 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
21. We may dispose at the outset of... the proposition relied on by the State Supreme
Court-that "The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not private
action." That proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and
press. It matters not that the law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common
law only ....The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
Id. at 265.
22. The constitutional guarantees require... a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
Justice Goldberg, concurring (in an opinion in which Justice Douglas joined), took pains to
distinguish the "private" defamation action: "The imposition of liability for private defamation does
not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First Amendment."
Id. at 301-02 (Goldberg, J.,concurring). Justice Black (again, joined by Justice Douglas) called for a
rule of "absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public duty." Id. at 295
concurring).
(Black, J.,
23. Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity
has carried the day in the court of history .... The invalidity of the Act has also been
assumed by Justices of this Court.... These views reflect a broad consensus that the Act,
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common-law rule of strict liability holding a defendant liable for defamatory

utterances irrespective of the degree, if any, of the defendant's fault, and a grant
of absolute immunity for criticism of official conduct. 24 The compromise re-

quires a public official plaintiff to demonstrate defendant's fault amounting to
"actual malice."'2 5
B.

Malice and Fault

"Actual malice" is one of several infelicitous phrases by which the law of
defamation assaults the English language. There is a general understanding of

the meaning of "malice" and its companion adjective "malicious." Throughout
the long history of the law of defamation, 26 "malice" has referred to the de-

famer's attitude toward the person defamed, connoting ill will or hostility. 27 As
used by Justice Brennan in Sullivan, however, the phrase refers to the defamer's

attitude toward the defamatory remark, connoting knowledge of or indifference
to its falsity. 28 The two usages are quite distinct, and only the former concerns
malice as commonly understood. The latter form of malice is not made any
29
clearer by the prefatory word "actual," when actually it is not malice at all.
Nevertheless, the phrase survives to create confusion,30 a confusion heightened
by the fact that true malice 1 continues to condition certain of the common-law

privileges 3 2 and is a prerequisite in most jurisdictions to the award of punitive
damages. 33 The result is that both types of malice may be involved in different
because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Id. at 276 (Brennan, J.).
24. Such absolute immunity was urged by Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg. See id. at 295
(Black, J., concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
25. See supra note 22.
26. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 1-29 (1978); S. HALPERN, THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND "MORAL RIGHTS" 2-6 (1988).
27. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. See supra note 22.
29. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one would use the word "maliciously" in this constitutional context. To say that an utterance was published "maliciously" would immediately conjure up
the idea of hostility, nastiness, or ill will rather than knowledge of or indifference to falsity.
30. Fifteen years after Sullivan, Justice Stewart took occasion to express his exasperation over
this unnecessary complication of an inherently difficult problem:
Although I joined the Court's opinion in [Sullivan], I have come greatly to regret the
use in that opinion of the phrase "actual malice." For the fact of the matter is that "malice" as used in the [Sullivan] opinion simply does not mean malice as that word is commonly understood. In common understanding, malice means ill will or hostility, and the
most relevant question in determining whether a person's action was motivated by actual
malice is to ask "why." As part of the constitutional standard enunciated in the [Sullivan]
case, however, "actual malice" has nothing to do with hostility or ill will, and the question
"why" is totally irrelevant.
Herbert,441 U.S. at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens recently observed: "The phrase
'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will."
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 n.7 (1989).
31. May we call it "classic" malice?
32. See generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 16, at 109
(5th ed. 1984) ("when the defendant's behavior is conditioned on a proper motive, the defendant is
exercising a privilege, such as the privilege of self-defense").
33. See, eg., Home Fin. Co. v. Ratliff, 374 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Ky. 1964) (to receive punitive
damages, plaintiff must show that defendant's actions may "be characterized as willful, wanton,
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aspects of the same case. 34 If the word must be preserved to describe the Sullivan fault standard, it would be better, and certainly kinder to the language, if we

called it "constitutional malice."
It is perhaps fitting that in seeking to understand and adumbrate the first
amendment limitations on the tort of defamation-reconciling relief for harm
from the use of language with the commandment that language must be freely
used-the courts have had to struggle mightily, and often clumsily, with
problems of definition and meaning. Words that one generally thinks of as having a common core or consensus of meaning take on different coloration and
35
texture, if not entirely new associations, in this context.

Although it is likely that Justice Brennan chose to define malice in terms of

what the publisher knew rather than felt to avoid the difficulties of tying a constitutional determination to a finding of improper motive, 36 the choice carries its

own problems of idiosyncratic proof. A plaintiff, under the Sullivan standard,
establishes requisite malice only by demonstrating, if not defendant's actual
knowledge of the facts, then defendant's subjective awareness of probable falsity. 3 7 Demonstration of the requisite malice requires extraordinarily extensive
and expensive discovery proceedings in which the plaintiff seeks to discover not

38
what the defendant felt or wanted (the presence of a malicious state of mind),

but what the defendant knew or thought or should have known or thought from
all of the surrounding circumstances. In short, virtually the entire process unmalicious [or] grossly negligent"); DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa. Super. 510, 568, 544 A.2d
1345, 1370 (1988) ("a public official, who must prove actual malice to establish liability in a defamation action, may not also recover punitive damages absent an additional finding that the defendant
acted with common law malice in publishing the defamatory statement"), appeal denied, 521 Pa.

620, 557 A.2d 724, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
34. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), in which Justice Stewart
reconciled the trial judge's finding of "malice" to impose liability for compensatory damages with
the concomitant finding of insufficient "malice" to support punitive damages:
[Tihe conclusion is inescapable that the District Judge was referring to the common-law
standard of malice rather than to the New York Times "actual malice" standard when he
dismissed the punitive damages claims. For at the same time [he] refused to grant the
respondents' motion for directed verdicts as to [the plaintiffs'] claims for compensatory
damages. And [he] was fully aware that the... "actual malice" standard had to be satisfied
for the [plaintiffs] to recover actual damages. Thus, the only way to harmonize these two
virtually simultaneous rulings... is to conclude.., that in dismissing the punitive damages claims he was not determining that [plaintiff] had failed to introduce any evidence of
knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.
Id. at 252.
35. The special, "constitutional" meaning of otherwise commonly understood words is particularly troublesome in the context of the "fact/opinion" problem. See infra notes 153-205 and accompanying text.
36. Compare the difficulty the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had in
determining whether the apparent attribution of a personal retaliatory motive to a state prosecutor's
decision to prosecute constituted an actionable statement of "fact" or a constitutionally protected
"opinion." Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302-05 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883
(1986).
37. "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968) (White, J.); see Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct.
2678, 2695 (1989).
38. That kind of inquiry, however, has long been necessary as a common-law matter in most
jurisdictions when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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derlying the publication is placed in issue and must be examined. 39 The result is

that while we have a clear, carefully defined constitutional criterion (however
unreal) called "malice," we concomitantly and necessarily have institutionalized
an elaborate, expensive, and ad hoc procedure that inhibits counsel's ability to

40
predict little more than the expense of a defamation action.

1. From the Sedition Act and Public Officials to Public Figures
Working from the broad social context "of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," '41 Justice Brennan found a constitutional privilege for falsely
based criticism of the official conduct of a public official. The Court thereafter

quickly, clearly, and expansively defined both the class of public officials 42 and
the scope of official conduct 43 embraced by the privilege. Had the boundaries of

constitutionalization of defamation been left where Sullivan's Sedition Act concerns put them-at the outer perimeter of official conduct of broadly defined

public officials-it is possible that the case development over the succeeding
years would have produced a coherent body of judicial thought from which a
sound doctrine of "constitutional malice" might have emerged. However, the

Sullivan doctrine grew not only in depth through the refinement and expansion
of public official and official conduct, but also in breadth, through the broadening of the classes of defamation plaintiffs subject to constitutional inhibition.
Three years after Sullivan was announced, the Court, by a strangely produced majority in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,44 held that the Sullivan rule
applied to "public figures" as well as public officials. Indeed, although the Butts
case is today a firmly established member of the pantheon of opinions that constitutionalize the law of defamation, it is one of the more oddly structured and
least clear-cut judicial pronouncements.4 5 In fact, the only consensus among the
39. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). As Justice Brennan observed, "[i]t
would be anomalous to turn substantive liability on a journalist's subjective attitude and at the same time to shield
from disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude." Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
Similarly, Justice Marshall, while dissenting, conceded that "[s]o long as Sullivan makes state of
mind dispositive, some inquiry as to the manner in which editorial decisions are made is inevitable."
Id. at 207 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). But cf id. at 199 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (inquiry into the
editorial process is irrelevant to the determination of malice).
40. As Justice White observed, "'Reckless disregard'.., cannot be fully encompassed in one
infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case adjudication
... " St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730. The case-by-case adjudication continues, with few unifying
principles.
41. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
42. In a subsequent opinion, Justice Brennan wrote:
Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest criticism of
government itself be penalized. It is clear, therefore, that the "public official" designation
applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have,
or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs.... The employee's position must be one which would invite public
scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-87 n.13 (1966).
43. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 273-77 (1971).
44. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
45. Justice Harlan wrote for the plurality in Butts, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and For-
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Justices was that a public figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted
with some degree of fault: four members of the Court proposed a standard of

"highly unreasonable conduct"; 46 two Justices preferred an absolute immunity

from defamation actions; 47 and three Justices proposed to extend the Sullivan
actual malice standard to public figures. 48 Essentially abandoning the Sedition
Act justification (and distinction) underlying Sullivan, Chief Justice Warren
equated the "public figure" and the "public official" on the grounds of a "blending of positions and power": 49
To me, differentiation between "public figures" and "public officials" and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no

basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy.... [Miany who do not
hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their

fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.
Viewed in this context then, it is plain that although they are not

subject to the restraints of the political process, "public figures," like
"public officials," often play an influential role in ordering society....
Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of
such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate

about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is
in the case of "public officials." 50

The actual malice fault standard for public figures became doctrine as the two
absolutists, Justices Black and Douglas, agreed to be counted in support of the

Chief Justice's extension of Sullivan to create a "majority" position.5 1 Notwith-

tas. Id. at 133. Chief Justice Warren wrote a concurrence, id. at 162, providing a majority for the
disposition of the appeal. Justices Black and Douglas, in a separate opinion, disagreed with the
reasoning of that majority but specifically concurred with the criteria set forth in Justice Warren's

opinion, id. at 170, as did Justice Brennan, in an opinion in which Justice White concurred. Id. at
172.
joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas).
46. Id. at 155 (Harlan, J.,
We consider and would hold that a "public figure" who is not a public official may also
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to
reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.
Id.
47. Id. at 172 (Black, J., concurring in part, joined by Justice Douglas). Justice Black stated:
"Ithink it is time for this Court to abandon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and adopt the rule to
the effect that the First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel
judgments." Id. (Black, J., concurring in part).
48. "I . . .adhere to the [Sullivan] standard in the case of 'public figures' as well as 'public
officials.' It is a manageable standard, readily stated and understood, which also balances to a proper
degree the legitimate interests traditionally protected by the law of defamation." Id. at 164 (Warren,
C.J., concurring). Justices Brennan and White expressly joined in this view. See id. at 172 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part). '
49. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
50. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
51. I concur.., based on the grounds and reasons stated in... the Chief Justice's opinion
order for the Court to be able at this time to agree on [a disposition of]this
•.. "[i]n
important case based on the prevailing doctrine expressed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ....In agreeing to [the Chief Justice's] opinion, I do not recede from any of the views
I have previously expressed about the much wider press and speech freedoms I think the
First and Fourteenth Amendments were designed to grant to the people of the Nation."
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standing this tainted ancestry, the proposition-founded on the rickety Butts

majority-that a public figure must prove that the defendant acted with constitutional malice and must otherwise comply with the Sullivan standards as elaborated in succeeding cases is now, as the Court has recently reiterated, accepted
2
without question.5

2. Public and Private Figures/Public and Private Issues
What remained after Butts, with its recognition that the first amendment

implications of the law of defamation were not bounded by concepts of public
officialdom, was the epistemological problem of determining criteria for further
adumbration of the boundaries of constitutional protection for defamatory
speech. The problem, simply, was defining the penumbra of protection for

53
speech defamatory of one who was neither a public official nor a public figure.

Was the rigorous standard applied to public officials and figures a consequence

of their status or of the correlative fact that they are involved in matters of
public interest and concern? In the absence of a first amendment absolutist position, 54 the answer to that question would determine whether the constitutional
Id. at 170 (Black, J., concurring in part) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398 (1967) (Black,
3., concurring)).
52. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 (1989) (Stevens,
J.) ("Today, there is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times
standard.").
53. A continuing problem, of course, has involved the definition of "public figure" and the
parsing of that classification into the further subclasses of "general purpose" and "limited purpose"
public figures. The Supreme Court has provided scant guidance beyond the generalizations of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). One federal court has noted:
The Supreme Court has identified two classes of public figures in addition to government officials: general purpose and limited purpose public figures. [The determination]
[w]hether a person is a public figure... is a difficult and sensitive exercise unsusceptible to
the application of rigid or mechanical rules ....
A person becomes a general purpose
public figure only if he or she is a well-known "celebrity," his name a "household word."
...
Such persons have knowingly relinquished their anonymity in return for fame, fortune, or influence. They are frequently so famous that they "may be able to transfer their
recognition and influence from one field to another."... Thus it is reasonable to attribute a
public character to all aspects of their lives.... The standard as generally applied is a strict
one; the Supreme Court has not found anyone to be a general public figure since Butts....
Although few people attain the level of notoriety to be public figures in all contexts, many
individuals may be public figures for the more limited purpose of certain issues or situations .... First, we isolate the controversy at issue, because the scope of the controversy in
which the plaintiff involves himself defines the scope of the public personality.... Second,
we examine the plaintiff's role in the controversy, to be sure that it is more than "trivial or
tangential."... Finally, we determine if the alleged defamation was germane to the plain-

tiff's participation in the controversy.
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772-73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). For discussion of the Gertz decision, see infra notes 59-71 and accompanying text. Compare Blake v. Gannett
Co., 529 So. 2d 595 (Miss. 1988) with Wiegel v. Capital Times Co., 145 Wis. 2d 71, 426 N.W.2d 43
(1988) (reaching different conclusions as to the status of apparently similarly situated plaintiffs).
54. Justice Black was most closely identified with such a position. See supra note 47. If one
believes that the first amendment absolutely precludes any action for defamation, then neither the
plaintiff's status nor the subject matter of the utterance are relevant. Justice Black was clear and
consistent in his absolutist view. See, e.g., JusticeBlack andFirstAmendment "Absolutes" A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 557 (1962) ("I have no doubt myself that the [first amendment],
as written and adopted, intended that there should be no libel or defamation law in the United States
.... just absolutely none so far as I am concerned."). Justice Douglas, at first apparently limiting his
absolute approach to matters involving public officials and public figures, in later years appeared
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inhibitions surrounding the law of defamation would arise from the nature of the

person about whom a defamatory utterance is made or from the nature of the
subject-the context of the utterance. In short, the issue that emerged, and
which had been hidden in the joinder of subject and person in the case of public
officials and figures, was whether constitutional doctrine would be subject based

or status based. The Court purported to resolve that issue on different occasions
and, in the course of that "resolution," increased the complexity of an already

troublesome problem.
The first "resolution" occurred in 1971, with Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.55 That opinion 56 sought to create a

constitutional standard based upon the nature of the defamatory utterance
rather than the status of the plaintiff. Justice Brennan wrote, in essence, that the
Sullivan standard arose from the public interest rather than the plaintiff's public

position:
We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues ... by
extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communica-

tion involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to
whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.... Drawing
a distinction between "public" and "private"5 7 figures makes no sense in

terms of the First Amendment guarantees.

The Rosenbloom formula, imposing the Sullivan standard on speech "in-

volving matters of public concern" irrespective of the status of the plaintiff,
flared 58 only briefly. In 1974, a decade of Sullivan was marked by Gertz v. Robfully to join in an absolutely preclusive position. See, ag., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 355-60 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Compare Justice Goldberg's position in Sullivan, in which he made clear both his opinion that defamatory comment concerning the official conduct of a public official was absolutely protected and that the Constitution did not reach "private" defamation. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297-305
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
55. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
56. Only Justices Burger and Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan's opinion. Id. at 30. Five
opinions, representing the views of eight Justices, were written. Only Justice Brennan's opinion had
as many as three supporters.
57. Id. at 43-44 (plurality opinion). Extending his Sullivan reasoning, Justice Brennan argued:
[Tihe constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to matters bearing
broadly on issues of responsible government. [T]he First Amendment extends to myriad
matters of public interest.... If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some
sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or
notoriety.
Id. at 42-43 (plurality opinion). In dissent, Justice Marshall raised the issue of judicial capability:
Courts ...are not anointed with any extraordinary prescience. But, assuming that under
the rule announced... courts are not simply to take a poll to determine whether a substantial portion of the population is interested or concerned in a subject, courts will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject; what
information is relevant to self-government.... The danger such a doctrine portends for
freedom of the press seems apparent.
Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Indeed, in light of Rosenbloom it was proposed that the Restatement (Second) of Torts be
revised to provide that "one who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning another on a matter of public interest is not subject to liability, unless he publishes it (a) with knowl-
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ert Welch, Inc.,59 in which a divided court rejected Rosenbloom 60 and created a
schedule of constitutional liability standards dependent upon the position of the

plaintiff as a "public" or a "private" figure. In his majority opinion, Justice
Powell, departing from the seditious libel and public interest rationales, concentrated on spectra of state and constitutional values, postulating a sliding scale by
which the first amendment interest in speech is to be balanced against the state's

interest in affording relief for injury to reputation. 6' The balance point for these
reciprocal interests-the degree of fault that a defamation plaintiff must establish-was to be a function of the status of the plaintiff. The test arose from the
plaintiff's self-help capability and risk assumption: 62 for the public official or
edge of its falsity, or (b)in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, at
288 n.70.
59. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
60. "The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would
abridge [the] legitimate state interest [in protecting the private individual] to a degree that we find
unacceptable." Id. at 346.
61. Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship .... The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to
protect speech that matters.
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the only societal
value at issue....
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require
the State to abandon this purpose ....
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press
and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury.
Id. at 340-42.
62. Justice Powell clearly elaborated the distinction he found:
[W]e believe that the New York Times rule states an accommodation between [concern for
the interests of the press] and the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions
brought by public persons.... [W]e conclude that the state interest in compensating injury
to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with
respect to them.
...
[W]e have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs. The first
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help-using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels
of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
...An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public
scrutiny than might otherwise be the case....
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position.... For the most part those
who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society....[T]hey invite attention and comment.
[..
[Tihe communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect
to a private individual.... He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of
his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for
redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only
more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.
Id. at 343-45.
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public figure, the Sullivan standard would apply; for the private figure plaintiff,
the states were free to apply a lesser standard, albeit one that entailed some
degree of fault:
We hold that so long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to
a private individual. This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the
strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press 63and
broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation.
Gertz, in short, authorized states to use negligence as a minimal fault standard
for a private plaintiff; the constitutional malice standard was not extended beyond the public figure 64 and the public official.
The Gertz dissents encapsulate the debate over the limits of constitutional
protection of defamatory speech. Justice Douglas forcefully reiterated the absolute prohibitory view 65 that "recognition of the possibility of state libel suits for
public discussion of public issues leaves the freedom of speech honored by the
''66
Fourteenth Amendment a diluted version of First Amendment protection.
Justice Brennan, adhering to his Rosenbloom position, objected to the use of a
lesser, negligence standard to the private plaintiff, urging application of the
"knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard in civil libel actions concerning media reports of the involvement of private individuals in events of public or general
interest."' 67 Against these restrictive views, Chief Justice Burger urged caution,
preferring "to allow this area of law to continue to evolve as it has up to now
with respect to private citizens rather than [having the Court] embark on a new
doctrinal theory which has no jurisprudential ancestry."' 68 Justice White, starting a line of thinking that he was to elaborate in subsequent opinions, strongly
objected to what he perceived to be an unwarranted interference with the state's
interest in protecting private individuals from defamation; he found no basis for
further constitutionalization of the common law.
63. Id. at 347-48.
64. Interestingly, although Justice Powell appeared to follow the reasoning of Justice Harlan in
CurtisPublishingCo. v. Butts calling for a fault scale, see supra note 46, he stopped short of adopting
a tripartite standard that would have required "gross irresponsibility" rather than "malice" in the
case of the public figure plaintiff. Justice Powell stated that characterization of individuals as public
figures would be determined by such factors as "the notoriety of their achievements [and] the vigor
and success with which they seek the public's attention." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. According to
Justice Powell:
For the most part, those who have attained this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as
public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention
and comment.
Id. at 345.
65. See supra notes 47 & 54.
66. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 358 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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For some 200 years ... [tihe law governing the defamation of
private citizens remained untouched by the First Amendment because[,] until relatively recently, the consistent view of the Court was
that libelous words constitute a class of speech wholly unprotected by
the First Amendment, subject only to limited exceptions carved out
since 1964.
But now, using that Amendment as the chosen instrument, the
Court, in a few printed pages, has federalized major aspects of libel law
by declaring unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 States....

t ..As I see it, there are wholly insufficient grounds for scuttling
the libel laws of the States in such wholesale fashion, to say nothing of
deprecating the reputation interest of ordinary citizens and rendering
them powerless to protect themselves. I do not suggest that the decision is illegitimate or beyond the bounds of judicial review, but it is an
69
ill-considered exercise of the power entrusted to this Court ....
The relationship between fault and the first amendment, begun in Sullivan,
ripened in Gertz apparently to encompass all of defamation. Some of the language in Justice Powell's majority opinion, however, left room for further exege70
sis. Specifically, there was some doubt, and a division in state court opinions,
as to whether the Gertz standards or common-law absolute liability would apply
71
to a private plaintiff suing a private, nonmedia defendant.
The Supreme Court could have resolved the issue in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders,Inc.,72 but in that case it chose both to create a new area
of confusion and to leave the standard for liability in doubt. Narrowly focusing
on the question of permissible damages, the Court made clear, notwithstanding
the plethora of opinions, 73 that the media or nonmedia status of the defendant
was irrelevant. With echoes of Rosenbloom, the relevant issue became not
whether the defendant was part of the media but whether the speech complained
of involved "matters of public concern." 74 However, the plurality opinion, limited to the question of the applicability of the Gertz damage standards, 75 did not
directly address the question of whether common-law absolute liability was constitutionally permissible when a private plaintiff complained of speech not involving a matter of public concern.
69. Id. at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Compare Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) (holding the Gertz
standards applicable to a private plaintiff's claim against a nonmedia defendant) with Greenmoss
Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983) (holding the common-law
standards applicable in such a situation), aff'd, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (Supreme Court affirmed without a clear resolution of this issue).
71. See Smolla, supra note 9, at 32-33.
72. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
73. The plurality opinion was Justice Powell's, in which Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
joined. Id. at 751. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White each separately concurred. Id. at 763, 765.
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
joined. Id. at 774.
74. Id. at 751 (plurality opinion by Justice Powell); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at
766 (White, J., concurring); id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
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The result is that one permutation of the defamation fault/constitutionality

matrix remains open to question. Although the short-lived Rosenbloom test for
determining the fault standard-concern with the public or private nature of the
utterance rather than the public or private nature of the plaintiff-apparently
had been terminated by Gertz, it may yet have vitality in a different context:
determining application of the Gertz constitutional negligence standard to a pri76
vate plaintiff.

The evolution of the bifurcated-if not trifurcated-fault standard was

neither inevitable nor the product of consensus. The movement from the strong
Sullivan consensus that a public official must carry a heavy burden in basing a
defamation action on criticism of his or her official conduct to the Court's frag-

mentation in Butts, Rosenbloom, and Gertz, when the character of the plaintiff
and the nature of the utterance changed, is indicative of the highly charged and
difficult balancing problems presented. The fact that we now take it as given
defamation doctrine that a public figure plaintiff must demonstrate constitu-

tional malice, and that a private figure plaintiff must demonstrate some fault,
although not more than negligence, should not mask the serious division of opin-

ion that precluded anything but slender and makeshift majorities for these constitutional policies. Indeed, it is the context of his own earlier critical words and
Justice White's repeated call for reexamination of the Sullivan doctrine exten-

sions that makes Chief Justice Rehnquist's Hustler reaffirmation of Sullivan and
its progeny77 noteworthy.

Nevertheless, the troubling questions repeatedly posed by Justice White remain. At the lowest level of public policy and interest-the private plaintiff

victimized by a private defamation-how does one justify upsetting more than
200 years of history excluding falsehood from the ambit of protected speech?
Why has constitutional doctrine reversing the common law of defamation with
respect to fault been expansive rather than cautious? 78 For Justice Brennan the

move from Sullivan to Rosenbloom was neither radical nor illogical; it was a
slight shift in focus from public position to public interest. Thus for Justice
Brennan, using the public interest as a fault delimiter was understandable, even
if one now finds such a dual fault standard undesirable. 79 However, the use of a
76. Although Justice Powell's plurality opinion was silent on the matter, Justice White inferred
(and argued) that "the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is...
inapplicable in cases such as this." Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 774 (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, however, found that there is no basis for not applying the Gertz fault standard. Id. at 781
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The question presented here is narrow.... [T]he parties [do not] question
the requirement of Gertz that respondent must show fault to obtain a judgment and actual damages."); see Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the
Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1535-46 (1987).
77. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
78. There may be ample reason for federal constitutional review of common law principles,
but it need not follow that there is any parallel presumption for constitutional rejection of
state common law principles. If anything, our prior intuitions should be just the opposite,
for the common law operates from a deep conviction in the importance of freedom of
speech .... If there is any presumption, it should be in favor of the constitutional permissibility of the common law rules. The necessary protection should be provided, where possible, without disrupting the good sense of the common law rules in ordinary cases.
Epstein, supra note 9, at 791.
79. See infra notes 230-95 and accompanying text.
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spectrum of fault, a level intermediate between the common law and that constitutionally mandated through public position, is conceptually troubling. That a
court or legislature, in general, may seek to define the elements of a cause of
action for defamation in such a multilayered way as a matter of state policy does
not give constitutional force or mandate to such a definition. This constitutionalization of each policy nuance is in many ways far more troubling than adoption of an absolutely preclusive constitutional doctrine. The essential Sullivan
balance, allowing the action but conditioning it on a strong showing of fault, was
a principled attempt at accommodation; the Gertz sliding scale, examining degrees of fault, does not have so solid a foundation.
One should, of course, never discount inertial factors. After Sullivan extended first amendment doctrine to defamation, the nature of the inquiry shifted.
For subsequent cases and situations the critical issue was not whether first
amendment implications existed, but rather how to accommodate those implications. Balancing of one kind having begun, continued balancing, if not juggling,
of conflicting concerns, with a concomitant complexity of result, would be consistent with human experience in most activities.
Beyond inertial matters, of course, are power and voice. By the 1970s, the
media explosion, both in terms of ownership. concentration of print and the
power of television, gave new force and a powerful voice to those most benefitted
by expansive application of the first amendment to common-law defamation.
There is, in short, a strong and experienced defamation "defendant's lobby," 80
vigilant and articulate. The call for an expansive reading of the first amendment
is-and ought to be-an appealing one. To the extent that a matter implicates
the first amendment, it implicates matters at the heart of American democracy.
The call to arms, particularly for the academic scholar, is irresistible and leaves
only to the most sensitive hearer the cry of the individual injured by the defamatory falsehood. The question then, why impair the long-established right of the
injured individual, can be heard only faintly, and those who raise it risk much.
The absence, perforce, of a "plaintiff's lobby," an organized and experienced
group concerned with the reputational interest itself as a societal value, leaves
only the jury, whose willingness to award what appear to be absurdly large
sums 8 1 gives substance to those who see the defamation action as a threat to the
first amendment.
It is the jury and the jury's damage awards that the Court addressed as it
developed extensions of Sullivan paralleling the extensions of the fault standard.
One path taken, a direct refinement of Justice Brennan's exposition, concerned
the basic procedural profile of a defamation action.8 2 The other path, emanating
from Gertz and farther removed from Sullivan, a virtual labyrinth constructed
out of distrust for the jury, concerned the nature and extent of damages 8 3 and
80. Consider the Libel Defense Resource Center in New York, created by media groups to
monitor and report on matters of concern to the organized press.
81. See Barrett, DeclaratoryJudgmentsforLibel. A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. L. REV.847,
856-57 (1986); Smolla, supra note 76, at 1521 n.l 1.
82. See infra notes 85-119 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 126-50 and accompanying text.
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the definition of an actionable defamatory utterance.8 4
C.

The ProceduralRevolution
Of the changes in prior law wrought by Sullivan the radical procedural shift

was at least as significant as the conditioning of liability on fault. Instead of the
common-law presumption of the falsity of a defamatory utterance, with the concomitant burden of proof of truth on the defendant, the plaintiff was required to

prove falsity. Moreover, at least certain of the elements of the cause of action
were to be proven with "convincing clarity," and the entire process was to be

subject to de novo appellate review.
1. Of Truth and Its Burdens
In Sullivan, Justice Brennan prohibited recovery by the public official plaintiff "unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice.' "85
More than two decades later, in PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,8 6 the

Court made it unequivocally clear that the public official and the public figure
plaintiff, required to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard with respect thereto, necessarily must bear the burden of

proving the falsity of the utterance at issue. 87 What was less unequivocal in
Hepps was the treatment of the private plaintiff, as a sharply divided Court held

that such a plaintiff, with a lesser fault burden to overcome, nevertheless must
prove the falsity of the utterance.8 8 The language of Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, 89 however, by referring specifically to the "media defendant," 90 ap-

pears to revive the media/nonmedia distinction. Justice Brennan concurred
separately in Hepps, both to object to the apparent reopening of this distinction
which Greenmoss had abandoned and to make clear his belief "that where alleg-

edly defamatory speech is of public concern, the First Amendment requires that
the plaintiff, whether public official, public figure, or private individual, prove
84. See infra notes 153-205 and accompanying text.
85. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
86. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
87. Id. at 775 (plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor) ("[A]s one might expect given the language of the Court in [Sullivan].... a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statement at
issue in order to prevail on a suit for defamation.").
88. According to Justice O'Connor:
In Gertz, as in [Sullivan], the common-law rule was superseded by a constitutional rule. We
believe that the common law's rule on falsity-that the defendant must bear the burden of
proving truth-must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff
bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.
Id. at 776 (per curiam).
89. Justice O'Connor wrote for herself and Justices Marshall and Powell. Id. at 767. Justice
Brennan, with Justice Blackmun, concurred separately. Id. at 779. Justice Stevens dissented, in an
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist joined. Id. at 780.
90. "[W]e hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand
when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern." Id. at 777
(per curiam opinion by Justice O'Connor).
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the statements at issue to be false." 9 1 The four dissenters 92 strongly objected to
the majority's overturning of the common-law presumption of falsity in the case
of a private plaintiff, finding in this intrusion into the state's interest'93in protecting individuals against assaults on reputation a "pernicious result."
Pernicious or not, there is of course a certain logical inevitability about
linking the burden of proof to the need to demonstrate fault. It appears almost
axiomatic to say that a public plaintiff, required to meet the Sullivan fault standard, which revolves around the defendant's attitude toward falsity, also must
prove falsity of the utterance. With the extension of the fault requirement, albeit
at a reduced level, to the private plaintiff, a similar extension of the burden of
proof as to truth or falsity is compelling as a matter of logic, even if not as a
matter of policy. The linkage of falsity to fault does produce procedural lacunae:94 just as Greenmoss left open the question whether common-law absolute
liability or constitutional fault requirements apply to the private plaintiff complaining of an utterance not involving a matter of public concern, so Hepps
leaves open the parallel question of burden of proof for such a plaintiff.
2. Convincing Clarity and Procedural Uniqueness
In constructing the procedural constitutional fence around the defamation
action in Sullivan, Justice Brennan was concerned with the quantum of proof as
well as the burden of proof. Striking down the judgment against the defendants,
he found "that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing
clarity which the constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not
constitutionally sustain the judgment... under the proper rule of law." 95 With
no further elaboration, the "clear and convincing" standard, at least with respect
to constitutional malice, 96 has become a part of the constitutionalized law of
defamation and a procedural hurdle distinguishing the defamation cause of action from most other private civil claims.
The procedural distinctiveness of the defamation action was embellished by
a divided Court in 1986 in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 97 As one of the dis91. Id. at 779-80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. Justice Stevens, with ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Id. at 780-90
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. I do not agree that our precedents require a private individual to bear the risk that a
defamatory statement-uttered either with a mind toward assassinating his good name or
with careless indifference to that possibility---cannot be proven false. By attaching no
weight to the State's interest in protecting the private individual's good name, the Court
has reached a pernicious result.
Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See Smolla, supra note 76, at 1526-29.
95. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
96. There is some confusion, and difference of opinion, as to whether the convincing clarity
requirement (as opposed to demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence) extends to the element of falsity or other elements of the defamation claim in addition to that of constitutional malice.
Although the Court recently noted this debate, it declined to resolve the question. Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 n.2 (1989).
97. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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senters 98 put it: "The Court, apparently moved by concerns for intellectual tidiness, [held] that the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard governing finders
of fact in libel cases must be applied by trial courts in deciding a motion for
summary judgment in such a case." 99 For the majority, Justice White argued
that because a plaintiff responding to a motion for summary judgment "need
only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor" 100
and because, as a matter of substantive law, a defamation plaintiff may not get a
favorable verdict unless the elements of the claim are established by clear and
convincing evidence,
a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be guided by
the [Sullivan] "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists-that is,
whether the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might
find that actual malice had been shown with convincing clarity.101
One dissenter found this proposition "deeply flawed, and rest[ing] on a
shaky foundation of unconnected and unsupported observations, assertions and
conclusions." 10 2 The other dissenters described the majority ruling as one that
would "do great mischief" because the Court "created a standard that is different from the standard traditionally applied in summary judgment motions without even hinting as to how its new standard [would] be applied to particular
cases." 10 3 Although Liberty Lobby itself apparently has little real practical effect, 10 4 its intangible impact may be substantial. It not only enhances and effec-

tively encourages the granting of defendants' summary judgment motions by
trial courts, but it also departs significantly from what previously had been a

strong conceptual separation between matters of procedure and substantive law
in the development of the constitutionalization of defamation. 105
98. Justice Rehnquist dissented, in an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined. Id. at 268
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan dissented separately. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 268 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 257 (White, J.).

101. Id.
102. Id. at 257-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 272-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Burger).
104. Id. at 269 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("There is a class of cases in which the higher standard
imposed by the Court... would seem to have no effect at all.").
It may well be... that the Court's decision.., will be of little practical effect. I, for
one, cannot imagine a case in which a judge might plausibly hold that the evidence on
motion for summary judgment was sufficient to enable a plaintiff bearing a mere preponderance burden to get to the jury ... but insufficient for a plaintiff bearing a clear-andconvincing burden to withstand a defendant's summary judgment motion.
Id. at 267 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Smolla, supra note 76, at 1532 ("Liberty Lobby is a
resounding [defendants'] victory on an issue of critical pragmatic importance.").
105. The process is clearly marked by the 1984 decision of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984),
in which the Court declined "to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws." Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91; see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Smolla, supra
note 76, at 1533-35. Professor Smolla, however, contrary to Justice Rehnquist's opinion, reads the
holding in Liberty Lobby as part of and consistent with the "principle of procedural neutrality" and
"[the Court's steadfast rejection of the importation of special first amendment standards to procedural issues." Smolla, supra note 76, at 1535.
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Independent Appellate Review

The final and perhaps most significant procedural thread emanating from
Sullivan concerns the nature of the appellate process in a defamation claim. In
articulating new standards concerning fault and the burden and quantum of
proof in a defamation action brought by a public official, Justice Brennan made
express findings of the constitutional inadequacy of the evidence presented, not
bound by findings of the trial court or the jury:
This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional
principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make
certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied....
We must "make an independent examination of the whole record,"...
so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.106
Twenty years after Sullivan, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 10 7 these words served to institutionalize appellate de novo review of the
record in defamation cases, apparently even to the extent that such review involves findings of fact, superseding the "clearly erroneous" standard of review
required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.10 8 The 1989 "clarification" of
the extent of the reach of Bose into jury findings in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton10 9 has not shed a great deal of light. 110 Although
106. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963))
(footnote omitted).
107. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
108. We hold that the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York Times v. Sullivan. Appellate judges
in such a case must exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.
Id. at 514. Again, the Court was divided, although here along more consistent lines as Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justice O'Connor, id. at 515, and Justice White dissented separately, Id. at
515. At least one state supreme court has taken the position that this extension of Sullivan does not
go so far as to preclude a different and lesser standard of state appellate review, at least in matters
not involving public officials or figures:
[Where actual malice need not be proven, we decline to embrace the independent review
requirement.... The negligence standard ...

that we have adopted is not a matter of

governing federal constitutional law; ... we have fixed the standard as a matter of state
law. Accordingly, Bose ... is not controlling on this issue.... [We will continue to adhere
to our traditional standard of review in defamation actions involving private-figure
plaintiffs.
Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 176, 181, 512 N.E.2d 979, 985 (1987)
(citations omitted).
109. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
110. Although there were no dissents to Justice Stevens' opinion, in which all but Justice Scalia
concurred, Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment, id. at 2700, as well as the brief concurring
opinions of Justices White, id. at 2699, Blackmun, id., and Kennedy, id. at 2700, indicate that doubt

still remains as to just which findings of fact are to be accepted unless clearly erroneous and which
are to be reviewed de novo under Bose. The various concurrences each sought to interpret Justice
Stevens' carefully limited words to embrace their respective views of the nature of the review process. The result, of course, is that the opinion is ultimately not very surprising in holding that independent review of the record does not necessarily entail independent resolution of conflicting
factual testimony. See id. at 2696-97. It is also rather anticlimactic in holding, as Justice Scalia
describes it, that the appellate court may accept "not all the favorable facts that the jury could
reasonably have found, but rather only the adequately supported favorable facts that the jury did
find." Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Bose is an example of how constitutional issues create a "constitutional fact"
treated as "law" for purposes of appellate review,"' "[tihe real issue is not
analytic, but allocative: what decisionmaker should decide the issue?"' 12 Bose
involves a policy determination that some matters are too vulnerable to be left to
the trier of fact, that an appellate fence in the form of unbounded independent
review must be erected to protect first amendment values.1 13 That such concern
warrants such extensive appellate preemption is at least open to question:
[T]he important judicial role in preserving the constitutional order is
adequately insured by the universal judicial duty to expound and refine
the applicable constitutional law. When necessary, that duty includes
further elaboration of the relevant constitutional norms.... But it
remains to be demonstrated that more is necessary; that is, that the
system of civil liberties is in material danger unless both the trial and
all appellate courts are required to render independent
judgment on
114
every application of constitutional norms to the facts.
There is indeed a consistency in the flow ofjudicial opinion I1 5 after Sullivan
providing an increasingly tight procedural rein on the defamation plaintiff. Certainly, the logical place for the common law to give way to first amendment
considerations is the nature of proof and the allocation of its burden rather than
the substantive essence of the tort. It is arguably a small, but necessary, constitutional step to reverse the common-law presumption of the falsity of the defamatory utterance.
With the focus shifted to a claim founded on false defamatory utterancesitself a balance to protect only against wrongly disparaged reputation-there is
little justification for presuming the falsity of the utterance and strong reason for
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate its falsity. Although one who utters something harmful to another's reputation arguably should have the burden of defending the utterance, 16 at least as compelling is the argument that falsity,
being as much a part of the defamation cause of action as the defamation itself,
is an element that the plaintiff must establish without benefit of an artificial presumption. 11 7 The place of truth in the defamation action, in short, is more an
historical anomaly than an inherent concomitant of recognition of the reputational interest, 188 and no violence is done to that interest by shifting the burden
I11.This contrasts with what Justice White has called "historical facts" such as credibility determinations or knowledge of falsity, which he suggests remain reviewable only under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Id. at 2699 (White, J.,
concurring).
112. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 237 (1985).
113. Id. at 242-43.
114. Id. at 268 (footnotes omitted).
115. Albeit by divided courts.
116. The defendant, having caused the harm, must then excuse the act. See Bezanson, The Libel
Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 555 (1988).
117. Thus, the plaintiff whose injury is proximately caused by the action of the defendant usually
may not benefit from a presumption that the defendant was negligent and must, with few exceptions,
bear the burden of proving that negligence. The defendant's negligence is part of the cause of action
to be proven; it is not for the defense to establish freedom therefrom.
118. Reputation, of course, is as injured by a true defamatory utterance as by a false one, and to
the extent that protection of reputation is the focus ofthe tort, the truth serves only to exacerbate the
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with respect to falsity.
When the issue became one of adjusting protection of reputation from communicative harm to constitutional protection of even harmful communication,

the logic of removing the anomaly of the place of truth in the traditional defamation action was joined by strong policy considerations to reverse that tradition. 119 Irrespective of the substantive nature of the cause of action, the
constitutional balance could reasonably have been struck by a coherent set of

procedural hurdles; that is, with speech itself being the wrongful act there is a
compelling logic to a high constitutional threshold concerning the burden and
quantum of proof. Stringent appellate review of the factual basis for crossing
that threshold is a necessary corollary.

In short, the gloss on Sullivan with respect to the plaintiff's burden of proving falsity and the convincing clarity evidentiary standard provided by Hepps,
Bose, and Liberty Lobby is, notwithstanding the Court's divisions, remarkably
consistent. Indeed, except for what may be a judicial overreaction with respect
to the scope of appellate review,1 20 one need not take an absolutist view of the
first amendment's impact on defamation to conclude that the reversal of the
common law in this respect is appropriate and should not be dependent upon
either the status of the plaintiff or the nature of the speech. Rather, to require
any plaintiff seeking judicial intervention for any harmful speech to demonstrate

its falsity clearly and convincingly isconsistent with a society that values highly
both speech and individual reputation.12 1 There is no need for ornamentation or

limitation of this fundamental procedural accommodation between the first
amendment and individual dignity by judicial inquiry into the content or context
of the speech.
harm. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. Thus, with "public order" at stake in the case
of criminal libel, truth was irrelevant. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, § 64; Franklin, The Origins and
Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 791
(1964); see also Bezanson, supra note 116, at 555 (noting the centrality of truth today); Franklin,
supra, at 808-12 ("[Tlhe basic proposition underlying the 'truth-is-a-defense' rule today seems to be
the importance of free speech in our society."); id. at 832-33 (postulating that it is not because of
improper past behavior-the subject of the true utterance-that plaintiff is disabled from suit, but
because "this added element alters the [free speech] balance sufficiently to warrant denying
liability").
119. Cf Bezanson, supra note 116, at 543 ("the constitutional privileges have limited the instances of the tort's operation to the very cases in which the least reputational harm has occurred"
(footnote omitted)). Dean Bezanson goes further, suggesting that Sullivan and its progeny have altered the nature of the tort itself: "The cumulative impact of the constitutional privileges has been
subtly but radically to change the 'reputational' character of the libel tort. The common law tort was
premised on harm to reputation. Today the tort protects against injurious falsehood." Id.
I am more inclined to believe that, at least with respect to the issues of burden and quantum of
proof, the constitutionalization process does not represent such a radical change. The tort has long
been concerned with injurious falsehood; the change is in the older presumptions with respect both
to falsity, see supra notes 118 & 85-108 and accompanying text, and the fact of injury, see infra notes
128-133 and accompanying text.
120. A reaction tempered somewhat by the caution exhibited in Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989). See supra note 110.
121. In this respect, it is unfortunate that the burden of proof of falsity remains unsettled with
respect to the "private" issue plaintiff and that the Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of the applicability of the convincing clarity requirement to proof of falsity. See supra note 96.
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OF PRODIGAL PROGENY: GER7Z AND THE LABYRINTH
OF DAMAGES AND "OPINION"

Coherent or not, the principal threads first spun by Sullivan concerned matters of fault and the process for determining fault and falsity as the means for
achieving the balance necessary to accommodate first amendment and reputational concerns. The fundamental ideas of fault-based liability coupled with procedural hurdles relating to falsity were fleshed out with fits and starts in the
years following Sullivan. One may quarrel with various parts of the theme and
its development and question the wisdom of a bifurcated (or trifurcated) statusbased fault schema. 122 Nevertheless, it is essentially comprehensive and com-

prehensible. It is not the basic cosmology created by the Court's development of
the essential Sullivan themes that produced a system "dripping with contradic-

tions and confusion and [providing] vivid testimony to the sometimes perverse
ingenuity of the legal mind as well." 12 3 Rather, one must look to the apparently
gratuitous and elaborate gloss imposed on that cosmology to understand why
the law of defamation today "falls substantially short of safeguarding press freedom and fails to safeguard individual reputation."' 124 With concepts rooted in
Gertz rather than Sullivan, the rococo law of defamation today is in many ways
similar to the ancient world of Ptolemaic epicycles:12 5 it has so many complexities and legal curlicues that it too is intelligible, if at all, only to a learned few
who, with more candor than their priestly predecessors, confess largely to inability to predict the future.
A. Damages as a Function of Fault

Gertz created a tiered relationship between fault and first amendment protection for defamatory utterances. 12 6 Justice Powell, however, did more than
enunciate different fault requirements for differently situated plaintiffs; he also
differentiated permissible damages, significantly changing the common law in
the process. In Sullivan Justice Brennan's response to the issue of the prospect
of inhibiting debate on public issues was to alter the nature of the defamation
cause of action and its procedural profile rather than to deal with the more idio122. See infra notes 230-95 and accompanying text.
123. Smolla, supra note 76, at 1519. In general, Professor Smolla notes that "the law structuring
the procedure for providing legal redress for reputational injury is in a period of unprecedented
flux." Id. at 1521.
124. Bezanson, supra note 116, at 556. Dean Bezanson finds the situation today "profoundly and
fundamentally disquieting." Id.
125. The theory of epicycles arose out of attempts to rationalize ancient Ptolemaic cosmology
with inconsistent observed celestial phenomena. Briefly, as the geocentric Ptolemaic cosmology, with
the sun, moon, planets, and stars revolving around a central earth in perfectly circular orbits, conflicted with early telescopic observation, an intricate network of suborbits, or epicycles was constructed through which each of the celestial bodies would march in sophisticated but circular arrays.
Through these complex epicycles the basic concepts of a central earth and circular orbiting bodies
were maintained. Of course, the structure to maintain it was so complex as to be inaccessible and
unintelligible to all but a handful of priests who, learned in the arcana, could pretend to an ability to
predict events. See F. HOYLE, ASTRONOMY ch. 3 (1962).
126. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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syncratic issue of damages. 127
In Gertz Justice Powell coupled the variable fault requirement to a corre-

spondingly differentiated damages rule. The Gertz Court found inimical to the
first amendment the common-law presumption of the fact of damage from publication of the defamatory utterance and the concomitant power and duty of the

jury to evaluate and quantify the "presumed damages" in the absence of direct
128

proof of harm:
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where
there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of
liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of
First Amendment freedoms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed
damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to
compensate
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a
1 29
false fact.

Justice Powell was similarly uneasy over the power in the jury to award punitive
damages:

130

In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently,
juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. And they remain
free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to
award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media
self-censorship ....

They are not compensation for injury. Instead

they are private fines levied by civil juries3 to
punish reprehensible con1
duct and to deter its future occurrence.1

However strong his distaste, Justice Powell nevertheless did not conclude
that presumed and punitive damages were simply constitutionally impermissible
127. The size of the damage award in Sullivan, however, with the "chilling" prospect it implied,
probably had as much to do with the result as more sophisticated doctrinal matters. Sce supra note
10.
128. As Justice Powell described it:
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of
purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional
rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of
publication. Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to
reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (plurality opinion by Justice Powell). Indeed,
the matter is definitional: if a defamatory utterance is one that "tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 559 (1977), then a finding that the
defendant published a defamatory utterance ipso facto entails a finding that the plaintiff has been
damaged. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, at 151-52, 537.
129. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (plurality opinion).
130. At common law, in most jurisdictions, a jury could award punitive damages upon finding
that the defendant acted with "malice," in the classic sense of ill will or intention to inflict harm on
the plaintiff, as opposed to the "constitutional malice" predicated on defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard with respect thereto. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, at 541; see also
supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text (describing the difference between "classical" and "constitutional" malice and explaining the role of each in a defamation action).
131. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (plurality opinion).
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(perhaps because he could not persuade the four others who were otherwise prepared to vote with him). Rather, he prescribed that a plaintiff, of whatever status, may not recover presumed and punitive damages absent a demonstration of
that "constitutional malice" requisite to a claim by a public official or public
figure. Thus, a private plaintiff who, under the Gertz fault standards established
liability by proving the defendant's negligence, 132 but not knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard, may not recover presumed or punitive damages. "[T]he private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are
133
sufficient to compensate him" for actual injury."
The difference between compensation for actual injury (however broadly
defined) 134 and presumed damages can be enormous. Thus, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson,135 a libel action by the manufacturer of Viceroy cigarettes against CBS and a controversial television commentator, the jury
awarded plaintiff $2,000,000 in punitive damages and $3,000,000 in presumed
compensatory damages notwithstanding the complete lack of any evidence that
the broadcast had any impact on plaintiff's business or that the plaintiff otherwise had suffered any actual damage. Based on clear findings of both commonlaw and constitutional malice, the district court found the punitive damage
award not excessive considering the defendants' net worth. 136 However, the
$3,000,000 in presumed compensatory damages was reduced by the court to a
nominal one dollar, with the observation that "substantial damages are not presumed . .. [and] '[p]resumed' damages does not ... mean that a plaintiff is
entitled to any amount a jury sees fit to award, entirely independent of the
1 37
evidence."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the punitive damages award but modified substantially the holding and reasoning of the district court with respect to presumed damages. It held punitive
damages constitutionally permissible if the plaintiff demonstrates both constitutional, knowledge-or-reckless-disregard malice and common-law, "classic" mal132. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
133. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell considered the sliding, reciprocal
scale on which one weighs the first amendment interest and the state's interest in reputation in
holding that a private figure plaintiff's fault burden extended only to negligence. Id. at 348-49 (plurality opinion). In this context, he found it "appropriate to require that state remedies for defama-

tory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. It is
necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury." Id. at 349 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell
took pains to make it clear that "actual injury" was not tantamount to elusive and difficult-to-prove
common-law "special damages" or to out-of-pocket loss. Rather, "all awards must be supported by

competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an
actual dollar value to the injury." Id. at 350 (plurality opinion). Shortly after Gertz the Court had
occasion to define "actual injury" broadly, finding the requirement met by a showing of emotional
injury, even absent evidence of reputational harm. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976).
134. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 460.
135. 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 1302 (1988).

136. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 644 F. Supp. 1240, 1263-65 (N.D. Ill.
1986), modified, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988).
137. Id. at 1261.
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ice. 13 8 As to presumed damages, based on a presumption of injury absent actual
evidence thereof, the court held they may be awarded in a substantial amount if
constitutional malice is demonstrated so long as the jury is "not carried away by
passion and prejudice."' 139 Accordingly, the court reinstated $1,000,000 of the
original $3,000,000 award, noting: "We recognize that this is a very inexact and
somewhat arbitrary process. Nonetheless, the process is inherent in the doctrine
of presumed damages."140
The Seventh Circuit assumed that Gertz, in expressly holding that punitive
and presumed damages are impermissible when the plaintiff need not and does
not demonstrate constitutional malice, impliedly authorized these damages if
that malice requirement is met. The words of Gertz, as words of limitation with
respect to the case before the Court, however, need not be read so permissively,
and the question in fact remains an open one.' 4 1 Certainly, Justice Powell's
language relating the balance between the state interest in individual reputation
and the constitutional interest in speech to the nature of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's injury, and the level of damages could be equally condemnatory of the use
of punitive and presumed damages in any defamation action. 142
In any event, following Gertz the matrix of status, fault, and damages had
grown fairly complex. With Dun & Bradstreetv. Greenmoss Builders,Inc. 143 the
matrix became bizarre. A majority of the Greenmoss Court held that the Gertz
actual injury requirement, with its preclusion of presumed and punitive damages, was not applicable to a private plaintiff "when the defamatory statements
do not involve matters of public concern."' 144 Justice Powell, continuing his
attempt to find balance among the conflicting forces, found the state interest at
its strongest and the constitutional interest at its ebb when a private plaintiff is
defamed in a private matter.145 The author of the Gertz actual injury balance
found no constitutional inconsistency in allowing the common-law damage rules
to apply to this private plaintiff/private matter complex:
We have never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains
when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern....
...We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance. It is speech on "matters of public concern"
that is at the "heart of the First Amendment protection." .. . In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First
Amendment concern....
While such [purely private] speech is not totally unprotected by
the First Amendment . . . its protections are less stringent ...
138. Brown & Williamson, 827 F.2d at 1138.
139. Id. at 1141.
140. Id. at 1142.
141. The Supreme Court could have clarified the matter, but chose not to when it denied certiorai in Brown & Williamson. 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988) (mem).
142. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
143. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
144. Id. at 763 (Powell, J.).
145. Id. at 757-59 (Powell, J.).
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[C]ourts for centuries have allowed juries to presume that some damage occurred from many defamatory utterances and publications ....
This rule furthers the state interest in providing remedies for defamation by ensuring that those remedies are effective. In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public
concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of
presumed 6and punitive damages-even absent a showing of "actual
14
malice."
Justice Powell was joined in his opinion by Justices Rehnquist and

O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White concurred, thereby creating
the majority, although they would have preferred to have had Gertz overruled

and Sullivan, as interpreted by the later opinions, reexamined. 147 Justice Brennan dissented, objecting to any diminution of the Gertz standards for a private

plaintiff.1 48 His dissent carried more than a little irony. Justice Powell, in Gertz,
had rejected unequivocally Justice Brennan's Rosenbloom standard by which the
public nature of the matter rather than the status of the plaintiff determined the
constitutional fault criterion. 149 In Greenmoss, however, Justice Powell used a
variation on the Rosenbloom public concern/private concern theme (first used in
Rosenbloom to expand the scope of Sullivan) to narrow the scope of his own
Gertz opinion. Justice Brennan', decrying this departure from Gertz, urged the

impropriety and unworkability of a subject-matter distinction to carve out an

exception to the Gertz rule prohibiting presumed and punitive damages in the

150
absence of constitutional malice.
Whatever the division in the Court, Greenmoss provides a gloss on Gertz

146. Id. at 757-61 (Powell, J.) (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 774 (White, J., concurring); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I continue to
believe, however, that Gertz was ill-conceived and therefore agree with Justice White that Gertz
should be overruled [and that Sullivan] should be reexamined. The great rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment carry with them certain responsibilities as well."); see infra notes 230-95 and
accompanying text.
148. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens).
149. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
150. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 786-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One may note, along with the
serious commitment, at least some part of the judicial tongue tucked firmly in cheek:
We believe that, although protection of the type of expression at issue is admittedly not the
"central meaning of the First Amendment," ... Gertz makes clear that the First Amendment nonetheless requires restraints on presumed and punitive damage awards for this
expression....
... [W]hen an alleged libel involves criticism of a public official or a public figure...
actual malice [is] a prerequisite to any recovery. When the alleged libel involves speech that
falls outside these especially important categories, we have held that the Constitution permits states significant leeway to compensate for actual damage to reputation. The requirement of narrowly tailored regulatory measures, however, always mandates at least a
showing of fault and proscribes the award of presumed and punitive damages on less than a
showing of actual malice....
In professing allegiance to Gertz, the plurality opinion protests too much. As Justice
White correctly observes, Justice Powell departs completely from the analytic framework
and result of that case.... Even accepting the notion that a distinction can and should be
drawn between matters of public concern and matters of purely private concern,... the
analyses presented by both Justice Powell and Justice White fail on their own terms. Both

300
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and adds another epicycle to the complex cosmology of the defamation action.
Granted, Gertz had eliminated the shortlived Rosenbloom public concern/private concern fault dichotomy when it substituted that of the public figure/private figure. However, it also tied the level and nature of damages to
constitutional fault. With Greenmoss, the public concern/private concern question returned, to provide a different constitutional authorization for commonlaw damages and to leave open the question whether it also created a third,
t5
constitutional, absolute liability category.1
Some perspective on the labyrinthine constitutional structure resulting from
the variations on the Sullivan and Gertz motifs may best be provided by a
graphic presentation:
152
Defamation: Constitutional Standards
Plaintiff
PUBLIC OFFICIAL:
Issues:Who is?

(Rosenblat,
Monitor Partial)
Official Conduct
(Monitor Patriot)
PUBLIC FIGURE:
Definition:

Liability Standard Minimum
Fault Required
"Constitutional Malice":
Knowledge of Falsity or

Reckless Disregard (Sullivan)
Test of "subjective awareness"

Damages Recoverable
Damages Standard
Presumed Damages and Punitive
Damages,subject to review for

reasonableness

Proof of Truth/Falsity Burden,
Nature of Proof
Plaintiff has burden of proving
falsity

Plaintiff must establish "nalice"
with "convincing clarity"

Same as Public Official (Butts,
Gertz)

Same as Public Official

(Sullivan, Bose,Liberty Lobby);
standard for other elements
not resolved (tiartelanks)
Same as Public Official

Negligence and "Actual Injury"
(Gertz)

Compensatory Damages for
"Actual Injury". No presumed
or punitive damages without

Same as Public Official, at least
where a "media" defendant Is
involved (tlepps)

(Gertz, St. Amant, Bose)

(Gertz; Firestone,
Hutchinson)

Limited? General?
PRIVATE FIGURE,
PUBLIC ISSUE:
Definitions:
(Gertz,
Greenmoss)

PRIVATE FIGURE,
PRIVATE ISSUE:

(Greenmoss)

Sullivan "malice"

Negligence? (Greenmos.
Compare Powell, White.

Brennan)

Presumed
and Punitive Damages
(Greenmoss)

Probably burden on defendant
(Hepps)

"Convincing clarity" not
resolved; but probably not
applicable

B. A Matter of Opinion

At common law, the privilege of fair comment was the primary vehicle for
protecting statements of opinion.153 The privilege was qualified and subject to
... propose an impoverished definition of "matters of public concern" that is irreconcilable

with First Amendment principles ...
... The plurality opinion ... recognizes, as it must, that the state interest at issue here
is identical to that at issue in Gertz... Thus, unrestrained presumed and punitive damages
for this type of speech must run afoul of First Amendment guarantees.

Id. at 775-76, 780-81, 785-86, 794 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
151. See supra note' 76 and accompanying text.
152. This chart is from S. HALPERN, supra note 26, at 382.
153. [S]tatements that could not be proved true were actionable, unless they were privileged. Because the defense of truth generally was unavailable for such statements, the
courts had to develop other defenses to protect statements that, although they could not be
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the defendant meeting an array of criteria.15 4 It "allowed everyone in society to
comment on matters of public interest, but the privilege extended to expressions
of opinions only and not to misstatements of fact." 1 " This elaborate qualified
privilege now has been effectively superseded by a constitutionalized "opinion"
doctrine emanating from Gertz.
Although Justice Powell's Gertz opinion had significant consequences with

respect to the central issues of fault and damages in a defamation action, those of
his words most often quoted were in the form of a general context-setting remark, not even amounting to dicta. The Justice observed:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other 156
ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statement of facts.

These apparently simple statements (with the syllogistic fallacy equating opinions and ideas) have served as the text for an elaborate and ongoing exegesis by

157
the state and federal courts to define and delimit the fact/opinion dichotomy.

In the process, the old common-law qualified privilege of fair comment has been
transformed into a constitutional absolute privilege for that which can be la-

belled "opinion" as opposed to "fact." In short, Justice Powell's remarks have
served to alter significantly both the substantive and procedural way in which we
determine whether an utterance is defamatory.
That the Gertz observation concerning actionable fact and protected opinion should be the source of what is probably the most confusing and least principled aspect of the constitutionalization of the law of defamation is particularly

ironic in view of its gratuitous nature: "The problem of defamatory opinion was
proved true, still might contribute to public discussion. Such statements would include
matters of taste and critical views on books, restaurants, and the behavior of prominent
individuals. The need to encourage these statements led the courts to create the privilege of
fair comment.
Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff'sBurden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 825, 854-55 (1984) (footnotes omitted). It is beyond the scope of this Article to review the
common-law history. Much has been written describing the privilege and its extent. For a thorough
discussion see W. KEETON, supra note 32, § 115; Keeton, Defamation andFreedom of the Press, 54
TEX. L. REv. 1221, 1223, 1240 (1976), and Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion,
and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1001, 1002-03 (1986).
154. A succinct, if not quite complete statement of this rather complex privilege has been
offered:
A statement is privileged if: 1) it is about a matter of public concern; 2) it is based on true
or privileged statements of fact that are either set forth with the disputed statement or are
generally known to the public; 3) it represents the actual opinion of the critic; and 4) it is
not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the one criticized.
Comment, supranote 153, at 1002; see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938) (the first Restatement,
of course, has been superseded by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977)). For a comparison of the Restatement positions, see Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1621 (1977).
155. Keeton, supra note 153, at 1223.
156. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (plurality opinion).
157. See Comment, supra note 153, at 1008-09 ("Nearly every jurisdiction in the United States
cites the Gertz dictum as binding constitutional authority."); see also id. at 1009 n.52 (collecting
cases).
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not remotely in issue in Gertz, and there is no evidence that the Court was speak-

ing with an awareness of the rich and complex history of the struggle of the
common law to deal with this problem."' 158 Nevertheless, as if from a magical
shibboleth, a constitutional doctrine has sprung from the Gertz comment, supporting the assumption that the Constitution protects absolutely that which may

be denominated opinion.' 59 This assumption was adopted expressly by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,160 as he observed: "The fact
that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.
Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense,
that consequence is a
16 1
reason for according it constitutional protection."'

The fact/opinion dichotomy is not a reflection of the relative harm done to
the stigmatized subject of the utterance. The harm from unwarranted pointed
ridicule or misplaced savage criticism can be just as devastating as that from the
wrongful accusation of reprehensible conduct.1 62 Prior to the more intense constitutional scrutiny accorded speech torts that began with Sullivan, the inherent
158. Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the FirstAmendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1239
(1976). But cf Schauer, Language, Truth, and the FirstAmendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry
Canter,64 VA. L. REv. 263, 292-94 (1978) (criticizing Gertz for not simply dismissing the action on
the grounds that the allegedly defamatory utterances, charges that the plaintiff was a "Leninist" and
a "Communist fronter," were protected opinion).
159. [A]t common law, the fair comment doctrine bestowed qualified immunity from libel

actions as to certain types of opinions inorder that writers could express freely their views
about subjects of public interest. However, since Gertz... the nature of this accommodation has fundamentally changed. In Gertz, the Supreme Court in dicta seemed to provide
absolute immunity from defamation actions for all opinions and to discern the basis for this
immunity in the First Amendment.
By this statement, Gertz elevated to constitutional principle the distinction between
fact and opinion, which at common law had formed the basis of the doctrine of fair
comment.
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Starr, J.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985); see also Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.) ("Opinion is absolutely
protected under the First Amendment."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986). Professor Schauer has
noted:
The absence of factual falsity now constitutionally precludes the imposition of sanctions for
defamation, and inquiries into factual truth or falsity have become matters of constitutional
importance in determining whether a particular defamation judgment is consistent with
freedom of the press.
Schauer, supra note 158, at 275.
160. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
161. Id. at , 108 S. Ct. at 882 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
745-46 (1978)). These words stand in sharp contrast to then Associate Justice Rehnquist's observation in Oilman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 1128-30 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for certiorari), with respect to the application of the Gertz language by the lower courts, See
infra text accompanying note 176.
162. As Professor Keeton has observed:
If defamatory matter is defined as matter that discredits a person with a substantial
number of respectable people, then derogatory opinions quite clearly are as defamatory as
derogatory statements of fact. So, if derogatory opinions are to be held nonactionable, tile
distinction cannot be based on the notion that opinions are not defamatory. Although people are in a position to judge for themselves whether an opinion is justified so long as the
alleged facts utilized as a basis for the opinion are proven to be true and are available to
them, most, if not all, people are often influenced by others, especially by the press and the
media, in formulating their opinions.... mhe reader is apt to be more influenced by the
opinion than the facts set forth to justify it.
Keeton, supra note 153, at 1244. Consider, for example, the long-term impact Kim Pring suffered
from a Penthouse magazine article that was held to be so clearly fantasy as to preclude belief and
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unbelievability of an utterance subjecting one to ridicule did not necessarily preclude recovery. 163 Now, constitutionalization, with the primacy of the interest
in the dissemination of truthful communication, 164 surrounds protected "truth"
with an insulating layer of tolerated falsity. The result, with respect to the definition of an actionable defamatory utterance, is a kind of demilitarized zone,

created as a matter of constitutional policy by a group of state and federal circuit
opinions, in which the formulaic designation "opinion" insulates an array of

otherwise actionable expression. Such a zone may be necessary, although it
therefore not actionable, Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied,
462 U.S. 1132 (1983):
Now whenever Kim walked down the street, men hollered out of open car windows,
"Hey, Penthouse, are you really that good?" She was plagued with obscene phone calls.
She literally had been driven out of the University of Wyoming by the laughter and,

although she was an above average, personable student, she was unable to get a job in her
home state.... Finally in desperation she joined the army and became a chaplain's assistant. But even there she was soon recognized.... She had no right to her name, no right to
peace and privacy, no right to recover for her pain and her humiliation.
Spence, The Sale of the First Amendment, 75 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 52.
163. See Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936). There, Judge Learned
Hand upheld a claim for libel arising out of a photograph which, because of the angle and other
fortuitous compositional factors made the plaintiff appear grotesque:
We dismiss at once so much of the complaint as alleged that the advertisement might
be read to say that the plaintiff was deformed, or that he had indecently exposed himself, or
was making obscene jokes .... Nobody could be fatuous enough to believe any of these
things; everybody would at once see that it was the camera, and the camera alone, that had
made the unfortunate mistake. If [it] is a libel, it is such in spite of the fact that it asserts
nothing whatever about the plaintiff, even by the remotest implications.... [I]t is patently
an optical illusion, and carries its correction on its face as much as though it were a verbal
utterance which expressly declared that it was false.... [But] notwithstanding all we have
just said, it exposed the plaintiff to overwhelming ridicule ....
Such a caricature affects a
man's reputation .... Literally.... the injury falls within the accepted rubric; it exposes
the sufferer to "ridicule" and "contempt."
Id. at 155. As to the fact that there could not under these circumstances be an issue of "truth" or
"falsity," a matter which today, under the even more compelling facts of Hustler and Pring would
constitutionally require dismissal, Judge Hand observed:
It would follow that if... the picture was a mistake on its face and declared nothing about
the plaintiff, it was not a libel.... Nevertheless, although the question is almost tabula
rasa, it seems to us that in principle there should be no doubt.... Usually it is difficult to
arouse feelings [causing the harm done to reputation] without expressing an opinion or
asserting a fact; and the common law has so much regard for truth that it excuses the
utterance of anything that is true. But it is a non sequitur to argue that whenever truth is
not a defense there can be no libel; that would invert the proper approach to the whole
subject.... [B]ecause the picture.., was calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than
trivial ridicule, it was prima facie actionable; .. the fact that it did not assume to state a
fact or an opinion is irrelevant ....
Id. at 156. Judge Hand's concern with the fact of harm from ridicule was apparent as he considered
that case:
When Judge Learned Hand was studying the case on appellate review, [at a luncheon at
the Harvard Club] he pulled the advertisement out of his brief case and without any comment passed it around the table. As we looked at it we burst into roars of laughter. "That
settles it," said Judge Hand. "It's defamatory."
L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, at 39.
164. As Judge Hand observed:
The only reason why the law makes truth a defense is not because a libel must be false, but
because the utterance of truth is in all circumstances an interest paramount to reputation;
it is like a privileged communication, which is privileged only because the law prefers it
conditionally to reputation.
Burton, 82 F.2d at 156.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

seems broader than that which a sophisticated analysis of both the nature of the
utterances and the nature of the harm would produce.

Notwithstanding their common characterization as protected "opinion,"
there are different categories of apparently fact-laden and offensive or vituperative speech that will be protected. There is the clearly factual statement whose
context may indicate rhetorical hyperbole, a warning that the statement is made

for effect and not to be taken seriously; 165 there is the related clearly factual
statement whose context may indicate rhetorical hyperbole in the sense of a
warning that it is made for effect and not to be taken literally. 166 The law has

not had a real problem with what is understood in context by the average recipient as rhetorical hyperbole, no matter how apparently fact-based the utterance
may appear.167 The inhibiting word, "opinion," clearly is used here in the sense
of an epithet or vituperative or humorous comment, as opposed to judgment,
considered conclusion, or that which we generally call "opinion."
The idea that rhetorical hyperbole, verbal license arising from the heat of
battle, the demands of humor, or the obviousness of a situation, is not actionable
is hardly a novel idea or a peculiar constitutional principle. This concept, really

a semiotic analysis, long has been part of the common-law approach to defining
what is defamatory. It asks whether the average intended recipient of the re-

mark would understand it in its literal, factual, defamatory sense rather than in
a figurative, pejoratively name-calling sense. In short, the common law, no less
165. For example, consider the following excerpt from a newspaper column poking fun at the
trend toward the use of men's underwear by women: "An informed source in the fashion industry
recently revealed that this fad was started by Mrs. Calvin Klein. She began wearing men's underwear the same day Calvin came home early and found a strange pair of boxer shorts hanging in the
shower." Columbus Citizen-Journal (Columbus, Ohio), Aug. 26, 1985. Notwithstanding its apparent implication of adultery, the statement could hardly support a defamation action by Mrs. Klein.
In Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376 (1980), the court dismissed the
complaint of a sports announcer who was characterized as "worst" in defendant's magazine's "Best
& Worst" feature, which described him as "the only newscaster in town who is enrolled in a course
for remedial speaking." Considering the context, it was inconceivable to the court that anyone could
treat the matter as anything but a joke:
Removed from context, the statement passes for a factual proposition whose sense is clear.
Only in context does it assume ironic proportion.... If the device is lacking in art, it is no
less figurative than a vague epithet or a soaring metaphor. And it deserves the same protection under the First Amendment.
Id. at 344, 403 N.E.2d at 380-81.
166. See, eg., Pring, 695 F.2d at 443 (dismissing an action notwithstanding characterization of
the material as "a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule [with] no redeeming features" since "the incidents charged were impossible[, the] setting was impossible[,] they were obviously a complete fantasy [amounting to] 'no more than rhetorical hyperbole.' "); Mashburn v.
Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 888 (La. 1977) (a restaurant review referring to two of the dishes as "trout A
]a green plague" and "yellow death on duck").
167. When the Supreme Court held in Greenbelt Cooperative PublishingAssociation v. Bresler
that the word "blackmail" uttered in a vituperative and pejorative context was mere "rhetorical
hyperbole" and not actionable, it was finding that there was a patent, unambiguous nonfactual context: "It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word "blackmail" .. . would
not have understood exactly what was meant ....[E]ven the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet." Bresler, 398 U.S. 6,
14 (1970) (Stewart, J.). The Court reasoned similarly a few years later in holding that the word
"scab" in a union dispute context of vituperation could be understood by the recipients only as an
expression of opinion. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1974) (decided the same day as Gertz and provoking a dissent from Justice Powell, who
found the words factual rather than hyperbolic, see id. at 296 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
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than the first amendment, protects the flamboyant, the exaggerated, and the utterance that is not intended to be taken seriously or literally where there are
168
sufficient signs alerting the recipient to that circumstance.
In some instances, the signs are so obvious that the characterization of rhetorical hyperbole follows as a matter of law, not necessarily by constitutional
mandate but by application of long-standing rules of construction for the determination of what is and what is not defamatory. 169 In such blatant situations
the courts have decided the issue not because the first amendment automatically
withdraws such questions from the jury, but because the courts found that any
other conclusion by a jury would be unreasonable and insupportable. Conversely, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, when Chief Justice Rehnquist acted to
protect a blatantly outrageous utterance, 170 he did so on the basis of ajury find17 1
ing that the material "was not reasonably believable."
The problem, both for law and language, becomes more complicated when
the matter concerns a different category of speech: commentary, whether or not
vitriolic, that is neither blatant fantasy nor hyperbole to make a point. In the
''political" statement of "fact," notwithstanding the apparent factual content,
the context may militate against specific believability, cautioning the audience to
take what is presented with several grains of salt. This much more sophisticated
problem of deciphering a speaker's signals is further encumbered with a constitutional gloss: the more recent cases, citing first amendment implications, have
held that the jury is to have no role in determining whether an utterance contains sufficient opinion signals to be absolutely protected. 172 In essence, determining whether an unclear utterance is a statement of fact has become a
question of law and not one of fact! Its resolution, of course, can be dispositive of
a case, as a finding of opinion will protect the defendant irrespective of the degree of fault or malice involved.
The proposition that the first amendment implications of the characterization of an allegedly defamatory utterance, a function in which the jury tradition168. The restaurant review cases are particularly graphic examples. See, e.g., Mashburn, 355 So.

2d at 888 (restaurant review refferring to two dishes as "trout Ala green plague" and "yellow death
on duck"); Greer v. Columbus Monthly Publishing Corp., 4 Ohio App. 3d 235, 448 N.E.2d 157

(1982) (review described food as tasting like ski boots). But cf. Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur, S.A.,
759 F.2d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the statement that the restaurant "served Peking Duck
in one dish instead of the traditional three can be viewed as an assertion of fact. The statement is not
metaphorical or hyperbolic; it clearly is laden with factual content.").
169. See, eg., Pring,695 F.2d at 443 ("it is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not
have understood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing else").
170. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 882-83.
171. Id.
172. See, ag., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 n.7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 883 (1986); Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 224; Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260, 721
P.2d 87, 90, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987); Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 290, 501 N.E.2d 550, 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (1986); Scott v. NewsHerald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 705 (1986); cf. Good Gov't Group v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 682, 586 P.2d 572, 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 262 (1978) (a contrary position,
holding that ambiguity requires jury resolution, sharply questioned in Janklow), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979).
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ally played a central role,173 warrants the total preemption of the jury's function
is neither clearly justified nor firmly established. "In a great variety of contexts
the pressing question is the extent to which thd Constitution itself controls the
allocation of functions among the various decisionmakers ... that commonly
participate at some stage in the resolution of all types of constitutional
claims."' 174 Although making it clear that the first amendment precludes predicating a defamation or other communication tort on a statement that is not received as factual, 1 75 the Supreme Court has not as yet adopted the jury
preclusive position taken by the lower courts. The assumption that the entire
process of determining what is defamatory has been constitutionalized, further
and unnecessarily burdens the defamation plaintiff, complicates an already baroque structure, and wreaks more havoc on our language.
Conflicting judicial pronouncements inevitably result as "lower courts have
seized upon the word 'opinion' [in Gertz] to solve with a meat axe a very subtle
and difficult question."' 176 In this context, close questions of fact produce
sharply divided statements of law in a given case, as the majority may hold that
a statement is patently protected opinion while an equally convinced minority
finds the same statement just as clearly to be actionable fact. 177 Paradigmatic of
the problem are the companion Ohio state court cases, Milkovich v. NewsHerald178 and Scott v. News-Herald,17 9 in which a newspaper columnist wrote

that each plaintiff had "lied at [an administrative] hearing after each having
given his solemn oath to tell the truth."1 80 Although a four-to-three majority in
Milkovich found this statement to be actionable fact, I81 an intervening election,
with a concomitant shift in personnel on the court, produced seven separate
opinions supporting a four-to-three finding of protected opinion for this same
82
statement in Scott.1
Having chosen the task of determining as a matter of constitutional law the
nature and quality of a given allegedly defamatory utterance, the courtsperforce
173. Generally, "[t]he meaning of a communication is that which the recipient correctly, or
mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to express." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 563 (1977). It is for the court to determine whether a communication is capable of
bearing a particular and defamatory meaning and, if so, it is for the jury to determine whether it was
so understood by the recipients. Id. § 614; see Clark v. American Broadcasting Co., 684 F.2d 1208,
1213 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying Restatement rule), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983).
174. Monaghan, supra note 112, at 231.
175. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
176. Oilman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 1129 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of peti-

tion for writ of certiorari).
177. Compare the majority and minority opinions in Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en bane determination in which eleven judges filed seven opinions), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883
(1986); and Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986) (a four to three
majority overruling the earlier divided-court decision in Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d
292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984), cert. denied sub nom. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953
(1985)).
178. 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984), cert. denied sub nom. Lorain Journal Co. v.
Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
179. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
180. Id. at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701; Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 293, 473 N.E.2d at 1192.

181. Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 299, 473 N.E.2d at 1197.

182. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701.
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have been required to develop constitutional criteria. The result has been a
proliferation of judicial fact/opinion tests or standards.18 3 Thus, Judge Starr
enunciated a "four factors" test in Olman v. Evans,184 while Judge Bork fo85
cused on a "totality of circumstances" analysis in his Olman concurrence;
the New York Court of Appeals made a far-ranging attempt at integration, calling ultimately for judicial "flexibility,' 18 6 while others endorsed the Restatement's "undisclosed defamatory facts" test,18 7 or the suggestion that the
183. There has, similarly, been a proliferation of scholarly comment, both viewing the present
morass with alarm and suggesting different kinds of tests. See, eg., Bezanson & Ingle, Plato's Cave
Revisited: The Epistemology of Perceptionin ContemporaryDefamation Law, 90 DICK. L. REV. 585,
606-07 (1986) ("the issues of fact versus opinion and of publisher state of mind-both of which are
products of constitutional doctrine, not of the common law-are shadows."); Franklin & Bussel,
supra note 153, at 869 (suggesting that the problem is obviated by the constitutional shifting of
burden of proof: "Perhaps the most important consequence of requiring the plaintiff to prove the
falsity of the statement is that the courts now can discard permanently the spurious distinction
between fact and opinion."); Gilson and Leopold, Restoring the "Central Meaning of the First
Amendment": Absolute Immunityfor PoliticalLibel, 90 DICK. L. REv. 559, 565, 572 (1986) ("The

opinion/fact distinction ... has ... created uncertainty.... [R]ather than helping to clarify the
waters of libel law, the opinion/fact distinction has only made them murkier." In response, the
authors propose an "absolute privilege for speech in a political context."); Zimmerman, Curbing the
High Price of Loose Talk, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 359 (1985) (proposing a modified "innocent
construction" rule); Comment, supra note 153, at 1046 (advocating test "that combines verifiability
with an examination of the context of the statement"); Note, The Fact-Opinion Determination in
Defamation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1988) (proposing that in case of matters of public concern,
utterances be held to be protected opinion unless explicitly factually defamatory); Note, The FactOpinion Distinctionin FirstAmendment Libel Law: The Need Fora Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEo. L.J.
1817 (1984) (would absolutely protect that which is clearly labelled "opinion" by the defendant);
Note, The Fact-OpinionDilemma in FirstAmendment Defamation Law, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
545 (1987) (essentially following the Restatement).
184. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
First, we will analyze the common usage or meaning of the specific language of the challenged statement itself. ... Second, we will consider the statement's verifiability-is the
statement capable of being objectively characterized as true or false?... Third, ... we will
consider the full context of the statement .... Finally, we will consider the broader context
or setting in which the statement appears.
Id. at 979 (Starr, J.).
185. Id. at 993 (Bork, J., concurring). Disagreeing with the use of any set of categories beyond a
broad distrust of the jury in a defamation action, Judge Bork observed:
The only solution to the problem libel actions pose would appear to be close judicial scrutiny to ensure that cases about types of speech and writing essential to a vigorous first
amendment do not reach the jury.... This requires a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances that provide the context in which the statement occurs and which determine
both its meaning and the extent to which making it actionable would burden freedom of
speech or press. That, it must be confessed, is a balancing test and risks admitting into the
law an element of judicial subjectivity.
Id. at 997 (Bork, J., concurring); see also Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254,
260-61, 721 P.2d 87, 90-91, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209 (1986) (explaining California's totality-of-thecircumstances test), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1032 (1987).
186. We eschew any attempt here to reduce the problem of distinguishing fact from opinion
to a rigid set of criteria which can be universally applied. The infinite variety of meanings
conveyed by words-depending on the words themselves and their purpose, the circumstances surrounding their use, and the manner, tone and style with which they are usedrules out ... a formulistic approach. A court must have the flexibility to consider the
relevant factors and to accord each the degree of importance which the specific circumstances warrant.
Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 291-92, 501 N.E.2d 550, 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1986).
187. See, eg., Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d 529, 716 P.2d 842 (1986). The Restatement
provides: "A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a
statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts
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problem be obviated by protecting absolutely that which is affirmatively asserted
and labelled by the publisher as "opinion." 1 88 When construing an utterance
susceptible of both a nonfactual and a defamatbry characterization, the courts

appear to have abandoned the generally followed "reasonable construction
rule"' 189 in favor of the much more limiting "innocent construction rule," by
which, as a matter of law, such an utterance is not actionable.1 90

As with constitutionalization of the word "malice," we are operating at a
meta level with respect to language, but without the necessary tools. The discourse is about the language we use, but the language of our discourse is peculiar

and distorted. Thus, we speak of "actual malice" when what we mean, actually,
is something quite different from malice. 19' Similarly, the pivotal role of "factual falsity" 192 engenders the pretense that we can distinguish "opinion," by
which we mean that which is not factually false, from other classes of communication. Neither our language nor our thoughts are so easily defined. "Factual
statements frequently include some degree of opinion, belief, or interpretation." 193 The result is a procrustean manipulation of the words to make a complex statement fit one of the two categories. In the process, the courts have

created a category of speech we might call "constitutional opinion," utterances
which, for a variety of reasons, not all of them concerned with the expression of
the speaker's opinion, will be protected as a matter of first amendment policy.

This penumbra of protection is the product of an unarticulated 194 policy defining and protecting certain forms of expression. It is a far cry from the general
protection of nonfactual utterances afforded by the Gertz dictum' 9 5 and by
as the basis for the opinion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). For an examination
of the background of the present section 566 as an attempt by the American Law Institute to accommodate the Gertz language, see Christie, supra note 154.

188. See, e.g., Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 262, 496 N.E.2d 699, 715 (1986)

(Wright, J., concurring) ("I would ... grant the media the right to attain absolute protection by
identifying an article as opinion.").
189. See supra note 173.
190. The "innocent construction rule," successor to the old common-law doctrine of mitior sensus, which required only a possible, not necessarily a reasonable, innocent construction of the words
to dismiss the claim, has been expressly adopted only in a few jurisdictions. See, e.g., Chapski v.
Copley Press, 92 Ill.
2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369,
453 N.E.2d 666 (1983); cf Zimmerman, supra note 183, at 436-46 (advocating a modified innocent
construction rule).
191. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
192. "If any given factor marks the line between protection and nonprotection, that factor inevitably involves a legal judgment subject to constitutional review. For defamation ... the division
between factual truth and factual falsity marks the line between constitutional protection and nonprotection." Schauer, supra note 158, at 276.
193. Id. at 278.
194. The clearest attempt at articulation, recognizing that indeed what is involved is policy
rather than doctrine arising from the concepts of "fact" and "opinion," may be found in Judge
Bork's concurring opinion in Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
195. Referring to the sweep of the Gertz dictum, Professor Keeton observed:
Perhaps, only general ideas about such areas as politics, government, philosophy, sociology, and race-as distinguished from opinions about people and their conduct-deserve
such affirmative protection. On the other hand, arguably the Supreme Court will ultimately
hold that the first amendment guarantees of free speech and press include the absolute
privilege to express all kinds of opinions about people and their conduct.
Keeton, supra note 153, at 1245.
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Hustler.
Moreover, one must question the assumption that such a policy-protected

category of what otherwise might be actionable speech is necessary to provide
first amendment breathing space. The process begun by Sullivan used fault and
procedural tools to strike the constitutional balance, affording protection from
absolute liability for certain defined kinds of speech. The broad proposition that

speech without credible factual content also is protected is hardly equivalent to
absolute protection for "political," "public," or similar expressions that otherwise would be actionable. Protection for speech in such sensitive contexts already exists in the heightened fault standards.196
Leaving aside an arbitrary policy choosing simply to protect absolutely
speech in certain sensitive contexts, the fact that the protection of opinion is
constitutionally mandated does not necessitate exclusion of the jury from the
interpretive process. While "an erroneous determination of [an utterance's perceived] factual truth in an area such as libel... may have the effect of improperly denying first amendment protection,"' 197 so too would an erroneous
determination of the fact of malice or of the truth or falsity of a disputed but
unquestionably factual utterance. That a matter implicates constitutional concerns does not for all purposes remove the jury from the process of determining
the appropriate facts. In the case of the meaning of a communication,1 9 8 the
fact involved is that of how the communication is, or reasonably ought to be,
received. In short, the question asked is how the "signs" emitted are interpreted
by the recipient.
If in fact our concern is with the signs that inform the specific words-the
degree to which a recipient is alerted to the nature of the utterance-then the
present preemption of the jury is unwarranted. "[T]he audience, or interpretive
community, ... is the site of reputational harm. If no one interprets communicative material as defamatory or disparaging, no harm exists, despite the falsity
of that material." 199
Opinion, as it is employed today, is simply a description of audience
interpretation. It cannot be meaningfully employed as a question of
law to be decided by the content of the words, the purpose of the
speaker, and the general context of publication, independent of the specific setting and interpretation of the audience....

196. As then Judge Scalia stated in his Olman dissent:
It is difficult to see what valid concern remains that has not already been addressed by
first amendment doctrine and that therefore requires some constitutional evolving-unless
it be, quite plainly, the concern that political publicists, even with full knowledge of the
falsity or recklessness of what they say, should be able to destroy private reputations at
will.
Olman, 750 F.2d at 1037 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Schauer, supra note 158, at 276-77.
198. But cf. id. at 276 (suggesting that the constitutional significance of the distinction "leads
necessarily to judicial evaluation, as a matter of constitutional law, of the truth or falsity of factual

statements").
199. Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 183, at 600.
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A legal framework which does not encourage, and at times does
not permit, inquiry into the actual interpretations and responses of a
reputational community endangers the very concept of reputation and
the validity of a body of law designed to protect it.... To acknowledge the participant/receiver in the negotiation of meaning within a

defamation context is only to restate a truism in mass communication
theory: that it2° is
less important what a speaker intends than what a
°
listener hears.

If the audience response is central, the jury is in the best position to discern
that response. To the extent that the proper and constitutional concern is with

the factual nature of the utterance as perceived, then this semiotic analysis can be
made comfortably only on a case-by-case basis in which the idiosyncratic fact of
the perception of the specific utterance under all of the subsisting circumstances
can be determined. Such a determination is no less a question of fact for the
trier of fact than other difficult fact issues; that it involves speech, with the corollary first amendment implications, 20 1 does not alter the essential nature of the
process. As with other such questions, of course, when a court can find that no

reasonable person would perceive the utterance in its "factual" sense, either because it is a form of rhetorical hyperbole or otherwise because of the signs inherent in the utterance, then the matter can be said to be "opinion" as a matter of o
law.

If the fact/opinion issue is seen not as a separate species of defamation
problems but as a subset of the overall problem of determining the meaning and
intendment of an utterance, the well-established rules allocating functions between judge and jury should apply. 20 2 There is no reason to use either the Gertz
dictum or the proposition that the Constitution protects matters of opinion to
200. Id. at 606, 607-08. One writer argues that the focus should be on the speaker and the
speaker's intention, rather than on the recipient of the remark:
[D]efamatory language is best defined as the illocutionary act of accusing. . . . [E]very
accusation contains an implicit statement that the charge is supported by fact.
On the other hand, an opinion, belief, or idea is simply a mental state. An expression
of an opinion is thus a report, statement, or assertion regarding one's own state of
mind.... Expressions of opinion ... do not have the force of accusing and are excluded
from the accusation definition of defamatory language.
[The various tests are not dispositive.] They are not the distinction between reporting
an opinion and accusing, but are clues the hearer may use to interpret an utterance when
the speaker does not clarify its force....
The ultimate question is whether the speaker is expressing her state of mind or accusing. The latter speech act implicitly represents that the charge is true according to culturally accepted criteria, and only this act should be regarded as defamatory.
Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEx. L. REv. 303, 343, 347-48 (1987).
201. Thus, it also triggers heightened standards of proof and appellate review. See supra notes
85-121 and accompanying text.
202. See, eg., Good Gov't Group v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 586 P.2d 572, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 258 (1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). Denying summary judgment to a defendant who
had characterized the conduct of a local political figure with respect to a construction project as
"blackmail" and "extortion," Judge Mosk observed:
In our view the article is ambiguous, and we cannot as a matter of law characterize it
as either stating a fact or an opinion. In these circumstances, it is for the jury to determine
whether an ordinary reader would have understood the article as a factual assertion charg-
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abrogate the reasonable construction rule20 3 in favor of a special and isolated
application of the innocent construction rule. 2° 4 In this light, little purpose is
served by the array of confusing and conflicting tests 20 5 that have accompanied
constitutionalization of this problem. Rather, the test is embraced in the general
rules requiring an examination of context and circumstances in determining
meaning.
IV.

OF PEOPLE

AND PRINCIPLE-AN EVALUATION

Most of those who have encountered the current law of defamation-the
fruits of the unfolding and embellishment of Sullivan-find it to be in a dreadful
20 7
state. 20 6 The very explication of the law and its nuances is a formidable task
and to characterize it as byzantine 20 8 is charitable:
In recent years we've heard an unremitting chorus of criticism
about the present law of libel. The attacks have come from all
quarters-from judges, academics, journalists, victims of libel, defendants in libel suits and attorneys for both defendants and plaintiffs. The
ing [plaintiff] with crime, or whether the statements were generally understood as an opinion respecting his public conduct in regard to the development project.
This conclusion is not contrary to our statement... that the distinction between fact
and opinion is a question of law; that remains the rule if the statement unambiguously
constitutes either fact or opinion. Where, as here, however, the allegedly libelous remarks
could have been understood by the average reader in either sense, the issue must be left to
the jury's determination.

Id. at 682, 586 P.2d at 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 262. But cf.Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300,
1305 (8th Cir.) (upholding summary judgment on the basis that Newsweek article was protected
opinion and expressly rejecting Good Gov't Group), cert denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Baker v. Los
Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986) (upholding trial
court's demurrer on the basis that allegedly defamatory broadcast was opinion rather than fact), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
203. See supra note 173.
204. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 183-190 and accompanying text.
206. As has been observed:
Because of the apparent lack of any coherent consensus on the Supreme Court as to what
the first amendment rules for defamation ought to be, and the proliferation of proposals for
dramatic alterations in the law of torts, the law structuring the procedure for providing
legal redress for reputational injury is in a period of unprecedented flux.... [The Supreme
Court's recent decisions have] thrown the already confused law of defamation into yet
deeper levels of chaos.
Smolla, supra note 76, at 1521, 1523; see also Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on
Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 772, 829, 832 (1985) ("Currently, the law of defamation fails both to
insulate the press from self-censorship pressures and to protect adequately the individual's reputation ....
In summary, the present system of liability for defamation does not ... compensate the
plaintiff rationally, yet it continues to threaten or chill communication."). For one author's proposal
to reform the law of available remedies for defamation, see Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 809 (1986) [hereinafter Alternative], building on the
earlier Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique ofLibel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L.
REV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Proposal].
207. See supra chart accompanying note 152.
208. Smolla, supra note 76, at 1519 ("The law of defamation is dripping with contradictions and
confusion and is vivid testimony to the sometimes perverse ingenuity of the legal mind. From its
inception, the law of defamation has been singularly bent on establishing its reputation for quirky
terminology and byzantine doctrine.").
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current system does not work well for anyone.20 9
The complications and curlicues that characterize the law are the product
of constitutionalization-the balancing process of accommodating the individual's interest in reputation to the perceived strictures of the first amendment.
The nature of the accommodating compromise has, as Justice Black warned
from the beginning, 210 inevitably produced both complication and practical failure. Perhaps one reason for the failure is the fact that the focus has been too
much on abstraction and not enough on reality.
It is very easy to posit the great problems in the law of defamation in terms
of abstract principle: the tension between the interest in reputation and the interest in the free dissemination of ideas. When the issue is framed as one between the first amendment, with all that this phrase connotes, and the
evanescent concerns of a single individual over the opinions of others, the first
amendment wins hands down. Compared to the perceived enduring needs of a
free society, reputation is indeed a transient thing. As careful readers of Othello
have noted, its glowing paean to invaluable reputation 21 ' was uttered by Iago,
one of literature's greater miscreants, who also tells us of the vacuous, ephemeral, and, ultimately, valueless nature of the esteem of others. 21 2 In this
21 4
context, 2 13 it is not surprising that, quite apart from the question of power,
thoughtful people have applauded each step in the process of constitutionalization of the law of defamation and expressed concern over those smaller steps
that have left open some windows for the individual to base a claim upon the use
of words or for the deliberation of a jury. When the fact of media power and
organization is added to the compelling abstract appeal of the cause of freedom
of speech (turning those who in another context would be called "defendants'
209. REPORT OF THE LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM:
PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW 9 (1988) [hereinafter THE ANNENBERO REPORT].

210. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171 (1967) (Black, J., concurring inpart)
("Itstrikes me that the Court is getting itself in the same quagmire in the field of libel in which it is
now helplessly struggling in the field of obscenity. No one, including this Court, can know what is
and what is not constitutionally... libelous under this Court's rulings."); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293

(Black, J., concurring) (urging the Court to prohibit states from awarding damages to public officials
even when they show actual malice because it "is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and
hard to disprove").
211. Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDIE OF OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE, Act III, Scene iii.

212. I thought you had received some bodily wound;
There is more sense in that than in reputation,
Reputation is an idle and most false imposition;
Oft got without merit and lost without deserving.
Id. at Act II, Scene iii.
213. See, ag., Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747,
777 (1984) ("Many of our ideas about reputation are products of a simpler era .... In today's
pluralistic society, much is tolerated and little is universally condemned.").
214. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
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tort lawyers into 'constitutional statesmen' "1)215 reform too often is measured by
2 16
how effectively it insulates the defendant from a monetary judgment.
Any workable approach to extrication from the unsatisfying present morass

must first abandon the idea that defamation plaintiffs are merely greedy parasites feeding on the protectors of American liberty.2 17 Defamatory matter does
hurt, even if the hurt cannot be quantified. It would take a truly callused soul
not to feel pain from public ridicule or from the public accusation of misconduct. It is all too easy to forget that the claim which implicates the constitutional questions-and which, for good or ill, is increasingly difficult to sustainis founded on that pain.2 18 In short, the law of defamation is very much about
people and our view of individual dignity. To the extent that an otherwise supportable claim is disallowed on constitutional grounds, the price we pay is in
terms of human pain. We must be very sure, therefore, that the benefit to the
public good justifies that price. Meaningful reform of libel law must respond to
the twin realities of the harm caused by defamation and the power of those in a

position to inflict such harm.2 19
There are, of course, many who do understand that the stakes in the act of
215. Judge Pierre Leval (United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York),
Remarks at the Annenberg Washington Program Conference (Feb. 13, 1989). See infra note 218.
216. As Professor Epstein notes, the tendency is to regard "the interest of the press as dominant,
so that once we can identify a chink in its legal armor, the proper response is to afford the press still
greater protection by edging closer to the absolute privilege." Epstein, supra note 9, at 785.
217. Dean Bezanson asserts:
The view of libel plaintiffs as persons with no confidence in their claim who manipulate the
legal process for personal ends seems greatly overbroad .... Rather than suing for improper or manipulative reasons, most plaintiffs seem to resort to litigation as a means of
self-help and legitimation of their claim.... Nor does the fact that some plaintiffs use the
legal system to pursue a meritless claim discredit the motives of all plaintiffs. Rather...
most plaintiffs sue for the simple reason that they have no effective alternative for redressing reputational harm.
Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 789, 807 (1986).
218. This was dramatically brought home at a conference sponsored by the Annenberg Washington Program on February 13, 1989 in Washington, D.C. to consider the ANNENBERG REPORT,
supranote 209. There were several panels composed primarily of journalists, media counsel and legal
academics; one panel, however, had a well known plaintiff, General William Westmoreland, whose
suit against CBS was highly publicized and ultimately discontinued. See generally R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA, AND POWER, 198-201 (1986) (describing case). What struck

one immediately, both in private conversation with General Westmoreland and in his public remarks, was his continued virtual obsession with "his" case, his need to tell his story and, in his eyes,
to set the record straight for those whom he might encounter. Rightly or wrongly, truthfully or
falsely, responsibly or irresponsibly, CBS had hurt him with its charges and the hurt lingered not far
beneath the surface several years after the rest of us had essentially forgotten the entire matter. See
also J.FAULK, FEAR ON TRIAL (1983) (plaintiff's detailed discussion of the circumstances surrounding Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 302, 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1962), modified, 19 A.D.2d
464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 899, 200 N.E.2d 778 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
916 (1965)); cf.Spence, supra note 162, at 52 (describing the impact of ridicule on the plaintiff in
Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983)).
219. As Professor LeBel notes, in a somewhat different context, "[r]ather than subjecting reputational interests to a first amendment trump, the participants [in what he sees as the political debate
over the reach of defamation law] ought to be increasingly responsive to more popular notions of the
fair treatment of individuals and the control of largely unchecked institutions capable of inflicting
serious harm." LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 779, 782 (1984).
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balancing are indeed high. 2 2 0 Certainly, the concept of "chilling" takes on
deeper meaning in the context of the possible financial ruin of a newspaper from
a libel judgment. 221 So too, after all of the snickers and knowing nods, the
meaning of "reputation" to an injured individual becomes clear only when one
can feel that individual's pain. Both concern for this pain and the problem of a

self-righteous and hubristic press clearly inform Justice White's strong dissent
from the Gertz imposition of fault and damage standards on the private defamation plaintiff,222 which he characterized as "deprecating the reputation interest

of ordinary citizens and rendering them powerless to protect themselves.

'223

Clearly, it was a sense of the consequences of Sullivan's constitutional compromise that caused him, in his concurrence in Greenmoss, to suggest not only re224
versal of Gertz but reevaluation of Sullivan.
Recognition of the untoward complexity of the constitutionalized law of
defamation and its failure to accomplish its purpose has produced a strong

movement for reform. 2 2 5 One path of reform, seeking to uncouple the interest
in vindication of reputation from the complexities of fault and the vagaries of

jury damage awards, would create an alternative declaratory judgment system in
which the plaintiff who establishes the publication of false and defamatory mat-

ter, not appropriately retracted by the defendant, may obtain a judicial declaration of falsity. In such an action, the plaintiff, who need not demonstrate any
degree of fault by the defendant, may not recover money damages. 22 6 The recent proposal of the Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, modeled
on this approach, goes a step farther and makes retraction an absolute bar to any
action. Moreover, it allows either the plaintiff or the defendant to preempt a
220. Professor Ingber, for instance, attempts to conceptualize the process as one involving the
powerful tension between "decency" and "reason." See Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between
Reason and Decency, 56 VA. L. REV.785 (1979); see also Ingber, supranote 206, at 819-39 (describing the defamation-law problem of having to choose between the important social values of free
expression and protecting citizens from unwise, hurtful expression).
221. See Smolla, supra note 9, at 12 n.72 (describing the plight of the Alton Telegraph, a small
newspaper that had filed a petition for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act after a jury
awarded more than nine million dollars to an individual libeled by a memorandum sent by two of its
reporters to a Justice Department official investigating organized crime).
222. See supra notes 59-64 and 126-33 and accompanying text.
223. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369-70 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); see supra
text accompanying note 69 (quoting Justice White's opinion).
224. I joined the judgment and opinion in [Sullivan]. I also joined later decisions extending
the [Sullivan] standard to other situations. But I came to have increasing doubts about the

soundness of the Court's approach and about some of the assumptions underlying it.... I
remain convinced that Gertz was erroneously decided. I have also become convinced that
the Court struck an improvident balance in the [Sullivan] case between the public's interest
in being fully informed about public officials and public affairs and the competing interest
of those who have been defamed in vindicating their reputation.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
225. "Reforming the law of defamation has become a prominent topic of national conversation,
as high visibility libel suits... pit powerful public plaintiffs against powerful media outlets, leaving
in their wake a flurry of commentary critical of the modern defamation system." Smolla, supra note
76, at 1520-21; see Ingber, supra note 206, at 832-39. Professor Smolla describes several of the libel
reform proposals. See Smolla, supra note 76, at 1521 n.8.
226. See Alternative, supra note 206.
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damage action by invoking the declaratory judgment alternative. 227 The goals
of this vindicatory system are indeed laudable: for most purposes the defama-

tion action would be simple, predictable, and inexpensive as the complexities of
the fault and damage rules would be obviated, the threat of "gargantuan jury

awards and runaway litigation costs" ' 22 8 eliminated, and the plaintiff afforded a
public expurgation of the defamatory matter. I must question, however, its un-

derlying assumptions 229 and the degree to which action on the basis of such
assumptions would in fact ameliorate the harm defamation can inflict on
individuals.
Simplification is a vital consideration. 230 Of course, the simplest solution is
Justice Black's: the inconsistency between the first amendment and an action for
defamation cannot be reconciled or compromised, and, therefore, the action cannot be maintained. 23 1 Such an absolute preclusion might well be better than the
233
present chaos, 232 as would a return to the common law of absolute liability,

presumed and punitive damages, and pleading and procedural rules that are reasonably comprehensible. Indeed, the English experience at least causes one to
question the reality of a "chilling effect" justification for the complete distortion
of the nature of a defamation action produced by our constitutionalization process. Although the unhappy experience of the Alton Telegraph234 is frequently
cited, there is no clear evidence that it is particularly exemplary 235 or that the
227. THE ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 209; see Barrett, supra note 81, at 851-52.
228. Smolla, supra note 76, at 1521 n.11; see Barrett, supra note 81, at 856-61.
229. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
230. According to Professor Keeton:
Securing to persons and other legal entities the good reputation to which they are
entitled and which they have earned, without discouraging the free flow of ideas and information so important to a free society, has proven a difficult task .... The maintenance of
this balance has ... engendered a complex doctrinal structure ....

The complexity of the

law alone is enough to provoke serious criticism. Distinctions that often seem to be theoretically sound become impractical in the actual administration of justice. Neither the values
that are protected by free speech nor those protected by the recognition of a tort action to
protect reputation can be safeguarded and promoted when the resolution of competing
values necessitates a large number of difficult decisions. Complexities can make it virtually
impossible to predict what the legal outcome of a simple controversy will be in advance of
trial or to complete a trial of a defamation case without making an error. Thus, protracted
and expensive litigation often results.
Keeton, supranote 153, at 1224. Professor Keeton describes 23 "decision points" essential to resolution of a modem defamation claim. Id. at 1233-35.

231. See supra note 54.
232. One might argue that public awareness of the absence of the remedy would cause recipients
of the defamatory remarks to be wary of taking them seriously, thereby mitigating the possibility of
any real harm. Such a result is not necessarily salutary:
If there is no law of defamation, then the mix between truthful and false statements will
shift. More false statements will be made. The public will then be required to discount the
information that it acquires because it can be less sure of its pedigree. The influence of the
press will diminish as there will be no obvious way to distinguish the good reports from the
bad, in part because no one can ever be held legally accountable for their false statements.
Epstein, supra note 9, at 800.
233. See id. at 802 ("ITihe proper rule in defamation is strict liability, as it was at common
law.").
234. See supra note 221.
235. Indeed, the newspaper's problems arose not from a story it published but from a memorandum sent by its reporters to an investigative body. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 218, at 74.
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American press has become particularly timorous notwithstanding the high cost
of defamation litigation. Meanwhile, the English press, largely still subject to
the common law, is notoriously "unchilled" and the threat of litigation does not
seem to have produced moderation over the years. 236 As Lord Goodman, then
the chair of the Newspaper Publishers' Association, observed in 1975:

A great newspaper-if it believes that some villainy ought to be exposed-should expose it without hesitation and without regard to the
law of libel. If the editor, his reporters and his advisors are men of

judgment and sense, they are unlikely to go wrong; but if they do go
wrong the principle of publish and be damned is a valiant and sensible

one for a newspaper and it should be responsible. Publish-and let
someone7 else be damned-is a discreditable principle for a free
press.

23

This is not to suggest that the English model is either applicable or preferable for
us. Rather, it suggests that the array of fault standards and other encumbrances
that characterize the current American law of defamation-most of which are
the product of closely divided Supreme Court opinions-are not so obviously
and necessarily requisite to the functioning of a free society. As discussed above,
the development of the complex matrix of defamation following Sullivan238
was
neither inevitable, nor logical, nor the product of any coherent consensus.
The declaratory judgment proposals do indeed simplify the law of defamation by eliminating the complex fault issues and allowing the focus to be where it
should: on truth. However, they do so at a price. Echoing the Gertz sliding,
reciprocal relationship between fault and damages, 239 the cost of this simplification is the elimination of damages entirely. The plaintiff seeking an effective
remedy for reputational harm produced by a false and defamatory utterance
must choose 24° between the almost impossible obstacle course of the present
action for damages or a judicial declaration of defamatory falsehood. If the
threat of damages today chills the press into somewhat more responsible behavior-a questionable assumption-there is little reason to believe that the limitation of sanctions to a form of reprimand would not serve as a license to
defame. 24 1
However, issues of responsible journalism and the excesses of the press be236. But cf TRB, Tea and Toleration, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 21, 1989, at 6 ("In Britain,
journalists live in dread of lawsuits.").
237. REPORT OF THE COMMIT'rEE ON DEFAMATION, CMND. No. 5909 211, at 53 (1975),
quoted in Keeton, supra note 153, at 1238; cf N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at 22, col. 4 ("The British
press is under increasing criticism for one of its most pungent features: recklessness.").
238. See supra text accompanying note 77.

239. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
240. Under the Annenberg Report, on the other hand, the plaintiff would have the choice imposed, because the defendant may elect to convert an action for damages into one for a declaratory
judgment. See THE ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 209.
241. As Professor Franklin has noted, the "mandatory" declaratory judgment proposal affords

the defendant the right to turn an action for damages into one for a declaration in which the defendant risks "exposure to nothing more than [attorneys'] fee shifting. The defendant's election removes
any deterrent effect of libel law by allowing irresponsible publishers to choose either to retract and
escape liability for attorneys' fees or to default and face only minimal fee shifting." Alternative, supra
note 206, at 839.
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come secondary if the declaratory judgment procedure would in fact afford the
defamed individual redress in a simple and efficient manner. The proposals assume that retraction or declaration affords such redress. The empirical work of
the Iowa Libel Research Project 2 4 2 has led to the conclusion that "effective response to alleged falsity, emotional relief, and vindication of reputation chiefly

appear to motivate most plaintiffs."'243 This in turn has led to the assumption
that vindication, in the form either of an appropriate retraction or a judicial
declaration of falsity, is paramount and sufficient redress for reputational harm.
On that assumption (and without considering the issue of deterrence or license

for media excess), the trade-off-a simple, no-fault determination of truth in
exchange for damages-appears fair. But the issue is not that simple. On the

one hand, it cannot be said that the Iowa Project demonstrates the lack of necessity for monetary relief, either as compensation or deterrence. 244 On the other,
the data hardly support such a gross departure from our damages-based right/
24 5
remedy system.
That the injury to reputation 24 6 -the consequences of being exposed to ridicule, obloquy, or contempt, to use the old common-law formula-is often not

precisely quantifiable does not mitigate its severity. The injury may be intangible, but it is nonetheless real, and the law in other contexts has been able to deal
effectively with that kind of harm.2 47 To be sure, money damages cannot restore

a damaged reputation, no more than such damages can restore a damaged limb
or a bruised psyche; nevertheless, absent any restorative remedy we have created

a legal structure that provides for a translation of the intangible harm into compensatory tangible form.2 4 8 When Justice White spoke of the vindicatory func242. The Iowa Libel Research Project was an undertaking "designed to explore the feasibility of
non-litigation processes through which libel disputes might be resolved." R. BEZANSON, G.
CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKi, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY ix (1987). The Project was begun by Professors Randall Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg, and John Soloski, building on the
work of Professor Marc Franklin in Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel. A Litigation Study, 1981
AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 455, and Franklin, Winners andLosers and Why: A Study of Defamation
Litigation, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 797. See Bezanson, supra note 217, at 789. The work of
the Iowa Project is described in detail in R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, supra.
243. Bezanson, supra note 217, at 808.
244. "The self serving assertion of many plaintiffs that they sue for non-monetary relief does not
support a conclusion that no plaintiff should be permitted a nontrumpable election to seek damages." Alternative, supra note 206, at 837 (footnote omitted). Indeed, there is little uniformity of
opinion as to just what the Iowa Project results mean with respect to the fairness or utility of eliminating damages as a remedy for defamation, as demonstrated by the divergence of interpretive opinion expressed at the Annenberg Washington Program Conference, discussed supra note 218.
245. Of course, nothing precludes a trial judge from requiring a special verdict, by which the
jury can determine the questions of falsity, fault, and damages separately, thereby effectively providing the vindicatory declaration in the context of the traditional action, a procedure followed in
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (the jury verdicts are reported in N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 2).
246. For a discussion and analysis of the values informing our concept of "reputation" see Bellah, The Meaning ofReputation in American Society, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 743 (1986) (in New Perspectives in the Law of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 677 (1986) (symposium)); Post, The Social
Foundationsof Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691 (1986) (in
symposium); Reston, Reputation and the Modern JournalisticImperative, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 753
(1986) (in symposium).
247. See generally Ingber, supra note 206 (discussion of how the system of tort law has and
should compensate plaintiff for intangible harms).
248. See id. at 775-76.
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tion of the defamation remedy, 249 or noted that "libel plaintiffs are very likely
more interested in clearing their names than in damages,"' 250 he was concerned
about limiting the damages remedy, not eliminating it. If the law of defamation
is more complex and inaccessible than it need be, there nevertheless is something
perverse about a no-fault/no-damages solution that benefits most those who suffer least and leaves the truly injured to muddle through the mess as best they
can. 25 1 In short, simplification need not be at the expense of the vulnerable.
An effective law of defamation must contemplate redress in the form afforded to other tort victims-money damages. Since the harm is individual and
not a function either of the plaintiff's status or of the public or private nature of
the speech, there is little reason for so differentiating the rules for compensatory
damages or for creating different fault standards for compensatory damages than
for liability. Nevertheless, that is the result of the Gertz/Greenmoss damages
rules. 252 They seem to be the product of a confusion of logical types or policy
expediency rather than a considered application of constitutional principle.
Compensatory damages should follow from liability. To the extent that presumed damages are constitutionally permissible or desirable, they are compensatory in nature; there is no sound basis for predicating the allowance of presumed
damages on showings of fault different from those requisite to liability. Thus,
the Greenmoss holding applying the common-law damages rules 25 3 makes sense
only if, as Justice White suggests, 254 it implies that the common-law liability
rules apply as well, while Gertz logically should have served to bar presumed
damages in any action.
A proper accommodation between the reputational interest and the first
amendment precludes the allowance of compensatory awards in the form of presumed damages that of necessity must be speculative, irrespective of the status of
the parties, the nature of the speech, or the degree of fault demonstrated. 255
There simply is no rational framework within which the court can assess the
propriety of a jury's presumed damages award and thereby carry out its constitutional review function. 256 Rather, the Gertz standard of awarding compensatory damages for actual injury provides a fair basis for compensating all
plaintiffs. As articulated in Gertz, such a standard relates to the fact of harm
and not its quantification, so that the injured plaintiff can be compensated so
long as the injury is attributable to the defendant's wrongful conduct. With
249. See supra text accompanying note 224.
250. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
251. See Ingber, supra note 206, at 832-39 (proposing a remedial scheme that attempts to avoid
this imbalance).
252. See supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text; chart accompanying note 152.
253. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 76.
255. There is a general consensus among those proposing reform that presumed damages should
be eliminated from damage actions. See, e.g., THE ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 209, at 25.
256. See Anderson, supra note 213, at 749-50 ("the process of fixing an amount of presumed
damages is inherently irrational"); cf.Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119
(7th Cir. 1987) (discussed supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302
(1988).
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proof of injury, traditional concepts of proximate cause sanction recovery f9r
direct and parasitic damages, controllable compensation for both the tangible
2 57
and intangible actual harms resulting from a defendant's act.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are peculiarly and definitionally related to degrees of fault. Despite the general distaste for them, 258 unless we are
prepared to say that punitive damages should never be allowed in any private
legal action under any theory,259 it is difficult to understand objection to a punitive award against one who has willfully and maliciously (in the true sense of the

word) inflicted harm on another. 2 ° The general rules for the allowance of punitive damages-requiring an intention to harm, together with close judicial review to control excessiveness-can hardly be said to impinge on the breathing
space afforded speech under the first amendment. The punishment is attendant
to the intention to harm rather than to the demonstrated falsity; there thus

seems to be little room for the additional knowing or reckless falsity requirement
of Gertz.
In short, effective simplification should not preclude the award of damages,

nor should it impair continuation and general application in all defamation actions of the array of procedural rules that emerged from the constitutionalization process. The burden of Sullivan was to ensure that a plaintiff recovering
damages met appropriate criteria and not directly to attenuate or modify the
damage remedy itself. These criteria, broadly speaking, involved interpolation
257. See Anderson, supra note 213, at 756-64. Professor Anderson, however, would require that
there be "proof of some harm to reputation in every case." Id. at 763 (emphasis added). As amplified
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1977), Gertz requires that there be "actual injury" caused
by the defendant's act, but not that it necessarily be injury to reputation.
Under the standard American approach to proximate cause in negligence actions, the unforeseeability of the precise manner in which a foreseeable victim suffers a foreseeable type
of harm will not preclude the defendant's liability, and the classification of the type of harm
that is foreseeable is subject to broad interpretation....
...
[A] distinction should be drawn between presumed harm to reputation and presumed damages. A presumption of harm to reputation supplies the injury element of the
tort action of defamation, and brings defamation into the tort mainstream .... A presumption of damages, on the other hand, entitles the tort plaintiff to compensation even in the
absence of any proof of actual loss. Although presumed damages permit a factfinder to
make an award of damages with no proven factual basis, presumed harm to reputation
does not necessarily have to be translated into any monetary recovery for the plaintiff.
LeBel, supra note 219, at 784-85.
258. Virtually all proposals for reform would abolish punitive damages. See, eg., Alternative,
supra note 206, at 813.
259. The Supreme Court recently has upheld the constitutionality of punitive damages in a tort
action challenged as an "excessive fine" impermissible under the eighth amendment. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). Although the Court expressed no

opinion with respect to the constitutionality of punitive damages as a matter of due process, an issue
that was not before it, the malice standards and close scrutiny employed in defamation cases would
militate against a finding of due process infirmity. Cf id. at 2923-24 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concurring with the understanding that the majority left open the issue whether due process protects a
defendant in a civil action from unreasonably large punitive damages awards impQsed by a jury that
receives only "skeletal" instruction from a judge on how to compute punitive damages properly).
260. But cf. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution", 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 803-07 (1984) (arguing that it is illogical to provide punitive damages when "bad" motives underlie defendant's false
speech, when no recovery is allowed for harmful true speech, regardless of defendant's motives).
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of fault into the substantive cause of action 2 61 and the erection of a series of
procedural hurdles in the way of recovery. 262 The procedural hurdles-shifting
to the plaintiff the burden of proving fault and falsity clearly and convincingly,2 6 3 with close, independent appellate scrutiny of the fact finding processappear to be the most clearly principled and readily workable way of accommodating the defamation cause of action to the first amendment.
Indeed, irrespective of one's view of the nature of speech to which the first
amendment applies-whether public speech is more deserving of protection than
private speech 264-there is little reason to bifurcate the constitutional procedural rules for defamation. The inquiry into the nature of either the plaintiff, the
defendant, or the defamatory utterance, which now causes so much of the complexity of the cause of action, need have no place in a claim to redress harm
caused by false published speech. The plaintiff in all cases should be required to
prove its falsity; so too, elevating the quantum of proof required to meet that
burden seems to be an appropriate constitutional accommodation, and should
not be a function of the nature of the speech, the speaker, or the subject. Moreover, a process of review in which the court serves as an independent check on
the propriety of the jury's application of the procedural norms is essential in a
system in which those norms are the paramount means of safeguarding first
amendment interests.
A unitary algorithm for damages and procedure is desirable, but if we are to
have simplified reform without an alternative noncompensatory system, the fault
complex itself must be changed. A unitary system, applicable to all claims irrespective of the nature of the parties or of the utterance, is the sure way to remedy the epicyclic, 265 unpredictable, and inordinately expensive present
system. 266 The need to determine the public or private nature of both the plaintiff and the utterance, and the application of an array of standards following
261. See supra notes 42-76 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.

263. The convincing clarity requirement for falsity is not yet

clearly established, see supra note

96, although the argument for it is compelling:

Because the demarcation between the truth and falsity of the statement is of constitutional dimension, imposition of a preponderance of the evidence standard on the plaintiff is
inadequate. If the plaintiff must persuade the court with convincing clarity that the defendant was at fault, the court certainly should not use a less rigorous standard to determine
whether the statement was false.
Franklin & Bussel, supra note 153, at 864.
264. See Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALF. L. REV. 761,
773-74 (1986).
265. See supra note 125.
266. Professor Christie accurately described the need for a single fault standard:
The law in the area of injury to reputation is on the verge of chaos. Attempts by the
Court to eliminate confusion have almost invariably increased it. The underlying reason for
these difficulties is likely traced to the fundamental assumption in Sullivan that it is possible to have different standards of liability depending on who is involved or ... what is
involved.... The result has been to put tremendous pressure on the fact-finding process,

which is asked to make largely subjective determinations, such as who is a public figure and
what is newsworthy .... The system is simply incapable of making these determinations in
a consistent and intellectually satisfying manner.
Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting Approaches, 75
MICH. L. REv. 43, 63-64 (1976).
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from those determinations, taxes not only the resources of the parties but also
the capability of the judicial system. 267 Return to common-law strict liability
and undifferentiated damage rules is, of course, one way of realizing a unitary
system not based on these troublesome distinctions. Application of the Sullivan

fault standard and the related procedural rules to all defamation actions also
would create such a system, as would modification of Sullivan to impose upon
all claims a lesser, but still effective, fault standard 268 coupled with the uniform
269
damages and procedural standards discussed above.
The risk to first amendment values--elimination of the breathing space for

innocent error and indifference to the prospect of serious press self-censorshipattendant to the complete abandonment of the constitutional requirement of

fault precludes serious consideration of a return to strict liability as the basis for
a coherent model for defamation. 270 Conversely, if unitary fault means extension of the Sullivan actual malice standard, 27 1 the resulting simplification also
would entail an unnecessary sacrifice of the interest in reputation, while in no
way mitigating the enormous litigation costs attendant to an action under that
standard. 272 The actual malice standard essentially has served to undercompen-

sate the injured victim of defamation while unduly burdening the entire litiga' 273
tion process. It has produced "grossly perverse results.
To the extent that one does not contemplate a significant change in the
267. Id. at 49, 55-56.
268. "The most feasible options are either to apply the Sullivan criteria to all types of defamation
or to apply the Gertz requirements of fault, in the form of mere negligence and actual damages, to all
types of defamation." Id. at 64.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 259-64.
270. But cf. Epstein, supra note 9, at 786-92 (questioning the wisdom of Sullivan's departure
from the common law).
271. The imposition of more stringent fault standards on a defamation plaintiff by the states is,

of course, constitutionally permissible and a number of states have established requirements more
onerous than those set by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Comment, JournalisticMalpractice: The
Need for a ProfessionalStandard of Care in Defamation Cases, 72 MARQ. L. Rav. 63, 71-72 (1988)
[hereinafter Journalistic Malpractice]; Comment, Attacking the Negligence Rule in Defamation of
Private Plaintiffs: Embers Supper Club v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 503,
508-12 (1986) [hereinafter Negligence Rule]. Although the issue of what states may do, have done,
and should do with respect to the constitutional minima is beyond the scope of this Article, it may
indeed be the major focus of activity if significant constitutional change is not possible. As Professor
Smolla has noted:
One of the worst by-products of the confusion in constitutional defamation law is that
it distracts attention from thoughtful management of the tort side of the system. So much
legal ingenuity and energy is consumed in determining what states are constitutionally free
to do, that the question of what states ought to do with the freedom they have tends to get
lost in the shuffle.
Smolla, supra note 76, at 1523.
272. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
273. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
The New York Times rule ... countenances two evils: first, the stream of information
about public officials and public affairs is polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and second, the reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be
destroyed by falsehoods that might have been avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts. In terms of the First Amendment and reputational interests at stake, these
seem grossly perverse results.
Id. (White, J., concurring).
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constitutional fault criteria, 274 reform is limited either to readjustment with respect to damages and the application of the procedural requirements, as previously discussed, 275 or to the development of piarallel systems which per force
must limit the injured plaintiff even more severely. Thus, the compromise proposals that trade fault for damages seek to stay strictly within the presently
enunciated constitutional doctrine 276 and produce an alternative structure
whose virtue of simplification does not offset its grave implications for the individual's interest in reputation. If one must accept either the proposition that
only a draconian fault standard can avoid the chilling effect of press self-censorship born of fear or the proposition that the Sullivan test is immutable, 277 then
the price of meaningful reform becomes too high for the injured individual.
Change in the Sullivan rule to accommodate the unanticipated reality need
not alter its essential, vital components, however. As Justice White suggested, 278 Sullivan must be reexamined in light of experience. Indeed, Chief

Justice Rehnquist's reaffirmation of the continuing force of Sullivan 279 is directed to its fundamental concepts and does not preclude an examination either
of its subsidiary ideas or of the more tenuous doctrine that emerged from the
subsequent decisions. In short, just as it is foolish to fix something that "ain't
broke," it is equally essential to try to fix something that patently doesn't work.

Without impairing the axiom that a speech tort must implicate the first amendment, effective solutions may require the conceit of assuming that a different

perspective on Sullivan can produce a somewhat different system, that our constitutional tools are flexible enough both to honor that proposition and to admit
of error and change.
In this connection, what has become significant about Sullivan, irrespective
of both the civil rights and the Sedition Act concerns that underlay the opinion, 280 is the constitutional grounding of a defamation action on both falsity and
274. See, eg., LeBel, supra note 219, at 784 ("the existing parameters of constitutional protec-

tion of speech and the press in defamation cases are, and should remain, well entrenched").

275. See supra text accompanying notes 255.64. Even here, since I suggest the permissibility of
punitive damages so long as common-law malice is established, some change in the Gertz minimum
would be necessary.
276. It is assumed that a no-fault declaratory judgment action, even one which awards counsel
fees, would not be constitutionally suspect under Sullivan and Gertz. These constitutional implications are beyond the scope of this Article. Whether or not the declaratory judgment approach passes
constitutional muster, I certainly cannot assume that the suggestions which follow could survive
attack without a rethinking of Sullivan and a substantial overruling of Gertz and the rationale of
Greenmoss.
277. Professor Epstein critically describes the Sullivan "actual malice" compromise as both constitutionally unnecessary and pernicious and advocates return to absolute, no fault liability. Epstein,
supra note 9, at 801-14; see also Shapiro, Libel Regulatory Analysis, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 883, 884-86
(1986) (suggesting that both the individual and the media are better served by a "performance standard of truth" than by a "process standard of reckless disregard").
278. See supra note 224.
279. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, -, 108 S. Ct. at 876, 882-83 (1988).
280. See supra notes 10 & 22-23 and accompanying text.
The source of many of the modern problems with the law of defamation is that the New
York Times decision was influenced too heavily by the dramatic facts of the underlying
dispute that gave the doctrine its birth. In consequence the decision has not stood the test
of time well when applied to the more mundane cases of defamation ....
Epstein, supra note 9, at 787.
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fault. Toleration of innocent falsity provides the necessary breathing room for
exercise of the first amendment. After twenty-five years, it is the change from
absolute to fault-based liability, rather than choice of a particular degree of fault,
that is the essence of Sullivan and the source of its enduring value. That bedrock
concept need not and should not be altered. The proposals to eliminate fault by
eliminating damages stray too far from the heart of the Sullivan accommodation. On the other hand, the Sullivan application of the fault principle, the
adoption of the constitutional malice standard, has served only to place an enormous burden on the injured plaintiff while radically escalating the costs of litigation for all parties and providing the basis for a status-based jurisprudence of
defamation. 2 81 Therefore, a single, uniform fault standard, predicated on the

defendant's behavior rather than knowledge, would remove most of the complicating ornamentation from the structure while providing both fairness to the

injured plaintiff and protection for the innocent, albeit erroneous, defendant.
Specifically, fault as we generally understand it in terms of negligence, al-

beit in a heightened form, could serve for all defamation actions, public or private. 282 The negligence standard proposed is that of "professional negligence,"

conduct conforming to the normal, usual, and reasonable standards of one situated as is the defendant. 283 This is the standard suggested in the Restatement

for private plaintiffs. 284 Thus, a professional disseminator of news would be
held to the standards of his or her profession while a different defendant would
be required to act reasonably under the circumstances applicable to that defend-

ant. For the press, being held to its own professional standards would seem to
281. As the progression of cases, with changing and shaky majorities, from Curtis to Greenmoss
suggests, there was an inertial quality to the process: the issue was regularly seen as how far to
extend the precise Sullivan standard rather than to examine the standard itself. See supranotes 42-76
and accompanying text.
282. This suggestion builds on a proposal made in 1976 by Professor Christie, calling for a unitary simple negligence standard. Christie, supranote 266, at 66 ("The only way to accommodate all
the conflicting interests in a manner that is socially acceptable ... will be to generalize the Gertz
negligence and actual damage solution."). While noting "the personal attractiveness of applying the
Sullivan criteria to all situations[, he anticipated] that the across-the-board application of the Gertz
standards is more likely." Id. at 64.
283. The "professional negligence" standard is considered more onerous for the plaintiff than
ordinary negligence. Thus, in an action by a private plaintiff, constitutionally subject to the Gertz
negligence standard, the Ohio Supreme Court, although it raised the burden of proof from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence, refused to raise the threshold to one of
"professional negligence." Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 176, 179-80,
512 N.E.2d 979, 983-84 (1987); see also JournalisticMalpractice,supra note 271 (discussing the
experience of those states that have adopted such a standard for the private plaintiff and advocating
such adoption).
284. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment g (1977). Section 580B proposes
the professional negligence standard in those cases in which the constitutional malice standard is not
applicable. Comment g provides, in part:
Putting the question in terms of conduct is to ask whether the defendant acted reasonably
in checking on the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the communication before
publishing it.
The defendant, if a professional disseminator of news, such as a newspaper, a magazine or a broadcasting station, or an employee, such as a reporter, is held to the skill and
experience normally possessed by members of that profession.... Customs and practices
within the profession are relevant in applying the negligence standard, which is, to a substantial degree, set by the profession itself, though a custom is not controlling.
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be sufficient protection, 2 85 particularly in the context of a simplified litigation
system with the constitutional procedural burdens on the plaintiff and better
guidance for a jury both in determining fault ajid in assessing damages.
There is a tendency to dismiss negligence as a workable standard for defamation liability, fearing that it would bring "strict liability back into the libel
area through the back door because it is simply too easy for plaintiffs to
prove."' 286 This too readily ignores the fact that negligence has served as the
paradigmatic fault standard; in contexts other than defamation the ideas of fault
and negligence are synonymous. The Gertz majority certainly did not feel that a
negligence test was equivalent to absolute liability or an undue burden on a free
press. 2 87 The Gertz dissenters were divided between those who urged that a
negligence fault standard was too harsh on the press and those who found it too
harsh on the injured plaintiff.288 Why then is there the assumption that, for
constitutional purposes, a negligence standard is no standard?2 89 Once again,
our assumptions may be less grounded in the legal propositions themselves than
in a distrust of the jury in defamation actions, a fear that the jury may seek more
to punish an overbearing press than truly to compensate one injured through the
fault of another. The answer to such possible abuses is not to assume an incompatibility between the jury system and the constitution. Neither reform nor effective protection of a free press need be at the expense of the jury. Hostility to
and distrust of juries, fueled by a number of well publicized and highly visible
examples of outrageously punitive damage awards, 2 90 has characterized much of
the constitutionalization process. 291 Apart from problems arising from perceived excesses of the press, the jury's difficulties in grappling with the issues
285. See JournalisticMalpractice,supra note 271, at 77-81 (advocating such a standard at least
where the Gertz negligence standard is applicable). Although opposed to the Gertz standard for
private plaintiffs, Professor Anderson has urged that, in that context, the professional negligence test
would be more fruitful:
A more fruitful approach involves adapting existing tort principles. The basic rule

would require publishers and broadcasters to exercise the skill and knowledge normally
exercised by members of their profession and would allow defendants to be judged by the
standards of their own medium and school ofjournalism ....Thus, magazines would be
evaluated according to the standards of the magazine publishing industry, not those of the
broadcasting industry, and the "alternative" press would be measured by its own standards
rather than those of the established media.
Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422, 466-67 (1975).
286. Alternative, supra note 206, at 823; see Anderson, supra note 285, at 428-29; Negligence
Rule, supra note 271, at 516-17.
287. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
289. Cf.Ashdown, Of Public Figures andPublic Interest-TheLibel Law Conundrum, 25 Whl.
& MARY L. REv. 937, 955-56 (1984) ("some courts [have adopted] a negligence standard for defamatory publications about private individuals without solicitude for first amendment values" (footnote

omitted)).
290. See Barrett, supra note 81, at 856-61 (collecting specific examples of well-publicized damages figures).
291. For example, Judge Bork asserted that: "The only solution to the problem libel actions
pose would appear to be close judicial scrutiny to ensure that cases about types of speech and writing
essential to a vigorous first amendment do not reach the jury." Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 997
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). See generally Schauer,
supra note 264 (focusing on the role of the jury in defamation actions).
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292
may be a function of their unnecessary complexity.
With or without the constitutional requirements as to burden and quantum
of proof and review of jury determinations, the courts are able to control the

overzealously punitive award. 293 Admittedly, there is a lack of efficiency in a
system contemplating an appellate check on the factflnder, but efficiency is not a
basis for a preclusive constitutional doctrine. Moreover, if-the jury were operating in the context of a simpler and generally less expensive system, the burden
on efficiency would be greatly ameliorated: acceptable jury action would be
more likely and the cost of obtaining both jury action and any necessary redress
would be lessened. In short, there would appear to be sufficient protections in
the totality of a constitutionalized defamation action, whose focus would be on
compensation for the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff through the clearly
and convincingly established fault of the defendant, arguably to support even a
simple negligence standard. By heightening that standard to one of professional
negligence, the remaining first amendment concerns should be obviated.
The inquiry under such a standard is not a general search for reasonableness, nor is it directed to the truly elusive determinations of state of mind that
our present standards require. Rather, the issue is the more specific, objective
one of behavior under existing and peer-recognized professional standards. For
the press, the analogue is to the fault standards applicable to medical or legal
malpractice claims-claims whose resolution certainly have far-reaching consequences for the defendants, transcending simply money damages. To make clear
that liability will attach to the demonstrated departure from standards that exist
as criteria of professional conduct is not leaving first amendment protection only
to the responsible journalist; it is asking, just as we ask our doctors and lawyers,
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that one who purports to be a professional behave professionally.
Thus, as suggested earlier, 295 for the threshold question of whether an utterance is defamatory, the constitutional protection for opinion need not require
abandoning the established reasonable construction rule, with its concomitant
role for the jury, in favor of complex, conflicting and unworkable tests. So too,
in a structure that avowedly seeks to provide redress for falsity produced by
fault, a simpler fault algorithm could serve to allow the jury to focus on redress
and compensation rather than retribution and punishment. All the legitimate
first amendment concerns are met by a workable and comprehensible schema of
liability for the infliction of harm by defamatory speech when that harm is the
product of a clearly and convincingly proven failure to adhere to the reasonable
standards of the publisher's profession. Only the most hypersensitive of reportorial skins could feel a chill from such a system.
292. "In part, the number and sophistication of the distinctions drawn by the substantive law
depend on the decision to require or to deny a jury trial because the notion that a jury can make
practical use of theoretical distinctions is simply a fallacy." Keeton, supra note 153, at 1224.
293. See, e.g., Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19 A.D.2d 464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d
899, 200 N.E.2d 778, 252 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965).

294. The Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the applicability of the constitutional malice
standard to public figures, see supranote 52, avoiding further fragmentation of the standards, would
not preclude overall reconsideration of an appropriate unitary standard.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
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CONCLUSION

The Sullivan compromise was an attempt to accommodate the interest in
reputation to the exigencies of the first amendment by conditioning liability on a
demonstration of fault and falsity under a more inhibitory set of procedural
rules than existed at common law. The ideals of Sullivan can be realized without either punishing innocent error or leaving the victims of defamation helpless.
To do so requires a reexamination of the specific implementation of these broad
ideals and adoption of a unitary approach to a constitutionalized law of defamation in place of the multilayered status-based system that has evolved. Such an
approach must be predicated on a realistic and professionally appropriate fault
standard, not encumbered with matrices of liability and damages revolving
around the status of the parties or the nature of the utterance.
The law of defamation, rooted initially in concerns for the soul of the
maligning sinner,29 6 has, over a long period of development, become the mechanism providing legal substance to our professed concern for individual reputation. The collision of that concern with our societal concern for the free
dissemination of ideas and criticism, the breathing space necessary to an effective freedom of speech, produced, first, the beacon lit by Sullivan and then, over
the next quarter century, the tortuous twists, combinations, and permutations
that mark the generally unsatisfying picture that emerges from that light. It is
time indeed to continue to affirm the heart of Sullivan but also to reexamine and
refashion that which has proven to be counter to the greater underlying principles. Just as Ptolemy's unwieldy heliocentric circular epicycles 297 gave way to
the Copernican comprehensible and simpler geocentric elliptical cosmology, so
too, the "center" of the constitutionalized law of defamation must shift so that
the reputational and constitutional balance can work.

296. See Anderson, supra note 213, at 774 ("Compensating harm to reputation was not the

original purpose of slander and libel actions. The ecclesiastical courts took cognizance of slander to
protect the soul of the slanderer.... Libel actions were created primarily as a means of protecting
government from the power of the printing press.").
297. See supra note 125.

